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INTRODUCTION

Souls are mixed with things; things with souls. Lives are
mingled together, and this is how, among persons and things
so intermingled, each emerges from their own sphere and
mixes together.
This is precisely what contract and
2
exchange are.

Are souls mixed with things, as anthropologist Marcel
Mauss argued in his eminent The Gift book, or are our
commodified lives neatly separated from our affective lives?
When it comes to law, does our legal system validate and
protect affectively motivated promises?3 For example, does our
law support a father's explicit and intentional promise to his
son to give him valuable bonds?4 The conventional legal
response is a definite negative answer: American contract law
has been described as having an "apparent prejudice against
gratuitous transfers,,,5 regardless of "how well-evidenced the
promise is and no matter how serious the promisor was.,,6
From here we can go on to the normative question of should
promises of this kind be enforceable? And indeed, legal
scholars have never stopped debating the enforceability
2

MARCEL MAuss, THE GIFT 20 (W. D. Halls trans., W. W. Norton & Co. 2000)

(1950).
3 In this article, I use the term "affective" interchangeably with "emotional."
This draws on the defmition of "affective" as "relating to, arising from, or influencing
feelings or emotions." MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 21 (11th ed.
2004), available at http://www.merriam-webster.comldictionary/affective.This is not,
of course, the only way one could define "affect." See, e.g., KEITH OATLEY, DACHER
KELTNER & JENNIFER M. JENKINS, UNDERSTANDING EMOTIONS 29 (2d ed. 2006)
(defming "affective" as comprehending a larger domain including emotions, moods and
dispositions).
4 These were the basic facts ofthe case of Young v. Young, 80 N.Y. 422 (1880).
5 Joseph Siprut, The Peppercorn Reconsidered:
Why a Promise To Sell
Blackacre for Nominal Consideration Is Not Binding, but Should Be, 97 Nw. U.L. REV.
1809, 1835 (2003).
6 Melvin A. Eisenberg, The World of Contract and the World of Gift, 85 CAL. L.
REV. 821, 822 (1997); see also Roy KREITNER, CALCULATING PROMISES 56-67 (2007)
(discussing the refusal to enforce donative promises and citing Beaver v. Beaver, 22
N.E. 940, 941-42 (N.Y. 1889), in which the court held: "The intention to give is often
established by most satisfactory evidence, although the gift fails. Instruments may be
even so formally executed by the donor . . . or there may be the most explicit
declaration of an intention to give ... yet, unless there is delivery, the intention is
defeated."). In the classic case of Dougherty v. Salt, for example, Judge Cardozo held
that an aunt's promise to pay her nephew $3,000 was unenforceable even though she
had filled out and signed a printed form of promissory note for that amount and
handed it to him. See Dougherty v. Salt, 125 N.E. 94 (N.Y. 1919).
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question. Most of them end up explaining and justifying the
mystery of the current refusal to legally acknowledge promises
to give gifts. The automatic refusal to enforce such promises
has an enigmatic aura because other Western legal systems do
not hesitate to enforce similar promises, and even AngloAmerican law enforced them in the past. What happened,
then, and why is it that we feel unsure about the appropriate
legal meaning of promises to give gifts?
In the intense debate over this question,7 Professor Melvin
Eisenberg suggests one leading explanation.s To him, we hold
to an unenforceability rule (and should continue it) because
promises to give gifts are fundamentally different from other
contractual promises. In fact, Eisenberg goes as far as to
suggest that common contractual promises and promises to
give gifts belong to two different worlds that are not fused and
should not be mixed. He argues that "[a]ffective values like
love, friendship, affection, gratitude and comradeship," rather
than common self-interested incentives, typify the world of gift
and the altruistic promises that are made in the intimate
sphere. 9 The affective roots of those promises stand at the core
of their unenforceability and have led Eisenberg and others to
define them as a special kind of gratuitous promises entitled
"donative promises."l0

7 While modern Anglo-American law is famous for denying the enforceability of
promises to gift, scholars have never stopped searching for explanations for this rule.
Their continuing questions have produced a scholarly counterpoint that is almost as
old as the rule itself. Professor Eisenberg refers to this growing body of literature that
calls for enforcement as the "third wave" of gift scholarship. He cites fourteen articles
that directly discussed the issue between 1988 and 1997. See Eisenberg, supra note 6,
at 831 & n.34. The debate has intensified in recent years, as several newer arguments
have sought to defend the rule and even more frequently to contest it. See, e.g., Robert
A. Prentice, "Law &" Gratuitous Promises, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 881 (2007) (a critical
analysis from the perspective of Behavioral Law and Economics).
8 Eisenberg, supra note 6, at 831.
9 Id. at 849.
10 Since the goal here is to directly address the kinds of promises that present
the most serious challenge to enforceability, and to deal with the most forceful
contemporary arguments against enforceability, this Article refrains from analyzing
gratuitous promises made in the business setting, or charitable contributions made for
self-commemoration. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90(2) (1981), which
recommends a rule of enforcement of charitable subscriptions. Instead, this Article will
focus on gratuitous promises that are motivated by emotion and are made in relatively
intimate settings. Therefore, if there is sufficient ground to enforce these highly
affective promises, then justifying the enforcement of all less-affective gratuitous
promises should become a straightforward move.
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While adopting Eisenberg's descriptive explanation, this
Article looks critically at the normative argument that follows
it in order to justifY a rule of unenforceability. Although
donative promises are based on emotions and are
fundamentally different from common market promises, it still
does not necessarily follow that only the latter promises should
be legally binding. This Article challenges the inherent conflict
between law and emotions by utilizing the new perspective of
law and the emotions to reevaluate the contemporary
arguments against enforceability.l1 One of this Article's central
11 Legal actors have traditionally assumed that emotions, believed to be
irrational, devoid of thought, and potentially dangerous, should remain outside the
legal sphere. See, e.g., Owen D. Jones & Timothy H. Goldsmith, Law and Behavioral
Biology, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 405, 438 (2005) ("Historically, emotions were thought to be
states of the mind that caused one to deviate from purely rational calculation .... ").

This view is starting to change, and an increasing number of legal scholars have
begun to explore the role of emotions in the law and the impact law has over the
emotions. While most of this work has focused on the criminal law, some works
have explored the role of certain emotions in non-criminal contexts such as
alternative dispute resolution and administrative, securities, tort, employment,
and constitutional law.
For works in the criminal area, see, e.g., JOHN BRAITHWAITE, CRIME, SHAME,
AND REINTEGRATION (1989); Susan Bandes, Fear Factor: The Role of Media
in Covering and Shaping the Death Penalty, 1 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 585
(2004); Theodore Eisenberg et aI., But Was He Sorry? The Role ofRemorse in
Capital Sentencing, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 1599 (1998); Dan M. Kahan, The
Anatomy of Disgust in Criminal Law, 96 MICH. L. REV. 1621 (1998); Samuel
H. Pillsbury, Emotional Justice: Moralizing the Passions of Criminal
Punishment, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 655, 655 (1989) (discussing emotions and
criminal sentencing). For works out of the criminal area, see, e.g., ROGER
FISHER & DANIEL SHAPIRO, BEYOND REASON: USING EMOTIONS AS YOu
NEGOTIATE (2005); Neal R. Feigenson, Merciful Damages: Some Remarks on
Forgiveness, Mercy and Tort Law, 27 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1633 (2000); Neal
R. Feigenson, Sympathy and Legal Judgment: A Psychological Analysis, 65
TENN. L. REV. 1 (1997); Catherine L. Fisk, Humiliation at Work, 8 WM. &
MARy J. WOMEN & L. 73 (2001); Peter H. Huang, International
Environmental Law and Emotional Rational Choice, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 237
(2002); Peter H. Huang, Reasons Within Passions: Emotions and Intentions
in Property Rights Bargaining, 79 OR. L. REV. 435 (2000); Peter H. Huang,
Trust, Guilt, and Securities Regulation, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1059 (2003); Owen
D. Jones, Law, Emotions, and Behavioral Biology, 39 JURIMETRICS J. 283
(1999); Erin Ryan, The Discourse Beneath: Emotional Epistemology in Legal
Deliberation and Negotiation, 10 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 231 (2005); Cass R.
Sunstein et aI., Assessing Punitive Damages (with Notes on Cognition and
Valuation in Law), 107 YALE L.J. 2071, 2095-100 (1998); Cass R. Sunstein,
Probability Neglect: Emotions, Worst Cases, and Law, 112 YALE L.J. 61
(2002); R. George Wright, An Emotion-Based Approach to Freedom ofSpeech,
34 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 429 (2003).
This diverse body of work has been described as an emerging field of
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goals is to inform the lingering scholarly debate with some
essential non-legal knowledge about the relevant concrete
emotions that playa role in the "world of gift." With no effort
made to learn about affective dynamics in gift situations, the
unenforceability rule seems grounded only in a general belief
that the law should avoid affectively laden problems. 12 The
need to further justify an unenforceability rule or to revise it
arises from the fact that adhering to the rule is not cost-free. 13
Similar to market promises, both the initial will of the
promisor and the initial expectation of the promisee are at
stake here. The legal system has to carefully consider a denial
of legal protection for both parties, especially if such denial
may denote that keeping such promises is less significant.
Since the idea of changing the unenforceability rule may
seem drastic, a few words about the scope of the discussion are
in order. The focal point of this Article is the freedom to
contract: the freedom of making legally binding donative
promises and enabling reliance on them. This Article is not
considering legal intervention with people's relationships or
emotions when their wish is to stay away from the law and
make promises that would be subject only to moral and social
norms. Both in the business arena and outside of it, people

scholarship called "law and emotions." See, e.g., Terry A. Maroney, Law
and Emotion: A Proposed Taxonomy of an Emerging Field, 30 LAW &
HUM. BEHAV. 119, 119-20 (2006) ("'Law and emotion' ... might now be
added to a family of interdisciplinary approaches that includes . . . law
and economics and feminist jurisprudence.").
12 In this respect, it is worth noting that harmonious intimacy may characterize
the birth of a donative promise, and the generous promisor usually does not breach the
promise. Instead, the promisor's heirs initiate the breach, as they tend to care more
about their financial self-interests and far less about the wishes of the promisor or the
valid expectations of the promisee. In other words, by the time the law has to speak,
many of the original emotions are gone and the breach that calls for legal response is
no longer that different from any other breach. See, e.g., Eisenberg, supra note 6, at
822-23; E. Allan Farnsworth, Promises To Make Gifts, 43 AM. J. COMPo L., 359, 363
(1995); MARVIN A. CmRELSTEIN, CONCEPTS AND CASE ANALYSIS IN THE LAW OF
CONTRACT 20-21 (2006); ROY KREITNER, CALCULATING PROMISES 45 (2007) ("Litigation
over the validity of gifts arises almost exclusively after the donor has died.").
13 Note that this argument presupposes that enforceability has a distinct value.
Legal enforceability is taken here as supporting the non-legal human behavior of
promising by an external mechanism supplied by society. This process has value
beyond the increase of the practical probability that the promise will be kept. It also
reflects society's belief in the importance, morality and value of the supported promise.
All this is currently withheld from donative promises, a point that will be further
developed throughout the third Part ofthis Article.
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should enjoy the recently acknowledged freedom iTom
contract. I4 The only question raised here is whether both
spheres allow people to enjoy similar levels of freedom to create
a contract, if they so wish. I5 This last question goes back to
Williston's days,I6 and it has not been answered. But it has
been repeated by such contemporary legal actors as Judge
Richard Posner:I 7 if a promisor wishes to make a legally
binding promise to give a gift, why shouldn't the law support
her?
The question whether to enforce donative promises is
theoretically meaningful and pragmatically significant. On the
theoretical level, it is connected to the larger question of the
boundaries of contract law: which promises should be enforced
and which should not? Is it up to the parties to decide whether
contract law will be applied to their relationship, or is it up to
the legal system to decide, as matter of public policy, whether
parties are allowed to create legally binding promises? More
pragmatically, the question is a pressing one. Despite the long
reign of the unenforceability rule and several legal
alternatives/ 8 people continue to engage in making donative
14 The symposium titled "Freedom from Contract" took place at the University of
Wisconsin Law School on February 7, 2004, and the papers were later published in a
symposium issue (2004 WIS. L. REV.). For a discussion of freedom of contract as
consisting of at least three different freedoms - the freedom in, from and to contract see Hila Keren, We Insist! Freedom Now: Does Contract Doctrine Have Anything
Constitutional To Say? 11 MICH. J. RACE & L. 133, 168-79 (2005).
15 This Article challenges the traditional belief that the difference between
commercial promises and donative promises requires contrasting legal regimes. It will
be later argued that in those respects that should matter to contemporary contract law,
the two kinds of promises share sufficient structural similarities to merit comparable
treatment. However, it does not deny the affective background or the special, valuable
character of donative promises. To the contrary: it insists on developing a nuanced
understanding of the distinctiveness of gift promising, in order to better evaluate the
question of its enforcement.
18 Melvin Eisenberg, The Principles of Consideration, 67 CORNELL L. REV. 640,
659 (1982) (citing Williston, who wrote, "[AJ person ought to be able ... if he wishes to
do it ... to create a legal obligation to make a gift. Why not? ... I don't see why a man
should not be able to make hinIselfliable if he wishes to do so.").
17 Richard Posner, Gratuitous Promises in Economics and Law, 6 J. LEGAL STUD.
411 (1977).
18 The main alternatives are trusts and wills, which are much less intuitive, far
more costly, cannot be created without professional help, require coping with
formalities, and are highly tinIe-consuming. All of these factors render trusts and wills
far less attractive devices for making promises to give gifts. See James Gordley,
Enforcing Promises, 83 CALIF. L. REV. 547, 570-71 (1995) ("By a trust, one can give
away any type of property by declaring that one holds it in trust for the donee. The
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promises in a contractual manner, which seems to presuppose
the assistance of contract law. 19 The gap between such
promising patterns, on the one hand, and the refusal of the
legal system to enforce the promises, on the other, gives the
ongoing scholarly debate a practical edge and further justifies
efforts to resolve the problem of enforceability - a task that this
Article seeks to accomplish.
Focusing on the interaction of law and emotions, this
Article unfolds in three parts. 20
Part I illuminates the
connection between the affective background of donative
promises and their modem unenforceability. It hypothesizes
that rejecting promises that are not supported by consideration
can be seen as an effort to distance law from any association
with irrational decisionmaking and to disassociate it from
"emotional" spheres.
Part II seeks to correct the erroneous way affective giving
has been perceived by law in the gifts context. The law must
carefully analyze each relevant emotion concretely and
separately, rather than treating emotion as an undifferentiated
aggregate. This part is dedicated to an interdisciplinary
investigation of the leading emotions that play a role in the
context of gifts and altruistic behavior: empathy and gratitude.
Part III integrates the knowledge gained in Part II with
the normative question of the desirable rule for donative
promises. It suggests that given the special function of
empathy and gratitude in the gift setting, the main
justifications for the enforcement of bargained-for promises
Part III
support the enforcement of donative promises.
concludes with the suggestion that enforcement should not be
dependent on the motives that led to promising and instead
trust is then irrevocable if the donor so declares, and the intention to create an
irrevocable trust will usually be found even without such a declaration.").
19 See, e.g., Levine v. Estate of Barton (In re Barton), No. W2004-02913-COA-R3CV, 2005 Tenn. App. LEXIS 825 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 28, 2005).
20 Those
parts correspond to three dimensions of law-and-the-emotions
scholarship as they have been recently defined. See Kathryn Abrams & Hila Keren,
Mos Afraid of Law and the Emotions 94 MINN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2010) (arguing
that the above three dimensions can be marked by three alliterative terms:
illumination, Investigation and Integration. "Illumination" stands for the task of
clarifying the often unacknowledged but significant role played by emotions in a
particular legal setting, "Investigation" stands for the interdisciplinary effort to better
understand the specific emotions at hand, and "Integration" stands for the normative
challenge of going back to law and reformulating it based on the new emotion-oriented
insights).
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would depend on the intention of promisors to be legally bound
by their promises. It is suggested that the freedom to make
legally binding promises would be afforded to players in all
spheres of life and less biased toward profit-seeking activities.
The Article ends with a concrete suggestion to move from total
refusal to enforce donative promises to a cautious willingness
to enforce them "consciously": only in cases of provable
intention to create legally binding promises.
1.

ILLUMINATING THE PLACE OF EMOTIONS IN THE
ENFORCEMENT DEBATE

The unenforceability of donative promises is often
explained by the fact that such promises typically emerge in
the intimate sphere and are motivated by strong affective
connection between the promisor and the promisee. 21 In
contrast to transactions made at the core of the market at
arm's length, they are not aimed at maximizing the revenues of
the parties and the contractual connection between the parties
does not start the relationship, but is the result of the
relationship's existence. Furthermore, counter to short-term
market promises, the relationship usually lasts long after the
promise has been made. 22
Despite those apparent dissimilarities, there is nothing
inherent in donative promises to render them unenforceable.
In many ways they are not that different from market
promises: their monetary value, their importance to the lives of
the parties, and their clear articulation are often comparable to
those of more common promises. Moreover, the common law
itself enforced donative promises in the past. Primarily, these
were subject to satisfying formal requirements such as the use

21 Eisenberg, supra note 6.
For an explanation of the decision to focus on
promises with such background, see note 10, supra.
22 The above-mentioned case of Levine can demonstrate those main features of a
donative promise. Levine, 2005 Tenn. App. LEXIS 825, at *20. In this case, the
promise was made (in writing) by a lover to his beloved one in the course of an intimate
relationship that lasted twenty-three years, until the death of the promisor. [d. at *2.
Mr. Barton promised Ms. Levine ongoing fmancial support, emphasizing his long-term
intentions. [d. He wrote, "rm not talking about the short term but the long term, until
to (sic) are settled comfortably fmancially. (However long that takes.)." [d. However,
upon his death his heirs refused to keep the promise, and Ms. Levine had to sue. [d. at
*4. She failed, as donative promises are not enforceable. [d. at *14-*18.

Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 2010

9

Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 40, Iss. 2 [2010], Art. 3

174

GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 40

of a seal,23 and sometimes by appearing to accept feelings like
love
as
consideration
that
justified
enforcement. 24
Comparatively, donative promises have enjoyed many years of
enforceability under other Western legal systems without
presenting any special problems. 25
The fact that enforceability could have been a valid
possibility for donative promises makes the modern AngloAmerican unenforceability rule a matter of choice, or
preference, to disassociate them from the law of contracts. The
decision to separate donative promises and deny them
enforcement, therefore, calls for a more careful examination:
one that focuses on law's complex relationship with the
emotions.
A.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF THE UNENFORCEABILITY OF
DONATIVE PROMISES

Despite periods of enforcement, an increasing reluctance to
enforce promises to gift developed throughout the second half
of the nineteenth century in a process that can best be
understood by contextualization. It is deeply intertwined with
other legal developments of the era that have produced what is
known as the classical doctrine of contract law. Contemporary
scholarship has already illuminated an essential part of the
context by pointing to the reformation of the consideration
doctrine during this period of time. In his 2001 article entitled
The Gift Beyond the Grave/6 Professor Kreitner convincingly
explains how classical contract-law theorists had intentionally
isolated donative promises and classified them as nonenforceable in an effort to create a new focal point for contract
law around the question of "which promises the law should

23 Joseph Siprut, supra note 5, at 1811-15 (tracing the history of the seal and of
comparable formalities and demonstrating that in the past such formalities were used
to make gratuitous promises binding).
2. See Mark K. Moller, Sympathy, Community, and Promising: Adam Smith's
Case for Reviving Moral Consideration, 66 U. Cm. L. REV. 213, 214 (1999) (describing
how "courts held that a donative promise, absent any bargain or promise in exchange,
became enforceable in 'affective' relationships").

25 JOHN P. DAWSON, GIFTS AND PROMISES:
COMPARED (1980).

CONTINENTAL AND AMERICAN LAW

26 Roy Kreitner, The Gift Beyond the Grave:
Consideration, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 1876 (2001).
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enforce.,,27 In his words:
Classical theorists revolutionized consideration and contract
generally, primarily by redefining it as the legal category
dealing with enforceable promises. Part of this redefinition
28
and categorization entailed burying the gift.

Kreitner's article offers an elaborated historical description
of the deep "cleansing,,29 work that was needed to accomplish
the goal of reshaping the consideration doctrine and to portray
contract law as the law that enforces free choices. 30 The new
and purified version of the consideration doctrine had the role
of a gate keeper - letting into contract law the valuable
bargained-for promises while leaving other matters out. 31 As
part of this process, contract-law theorists had deliberately
made gratuitous promises an unwelcome guest in the house of
contracts. 32 As Kreitner explains, the" clean up project' meant,
inter alia, setting a limitation on the freedom of contract of
those who were engaged in gift giving and receiving as it
denied them state enforcement that was available in the past. 33
Kreitner's rhetoric of cleansing is important for our
discussion. While his analysis of the past remains "hygienic"
and focuses on the positive and constructive purpose of the
cleansing project,34 I want to add the mirror image: the
negative and destructive side of the same reform; the
ideological background that had led to the treatment of
donative promises as if they were, to continue with the
sanitization metaphor, waste.
The argument that the disposal of donative promises was a
chief means to the goal of the classical effort to redefine the
consideration doctrine is well grounded in writings of the

Id. at
Id. at
29 Id. at
30 Id. at
31
Id.
27

28

1882.
1879.
1844.
1895.

Kreitner, supra note 26, at 1895.
Id. at 1884-95.
34 Generally, Kreitner argues that the reformulation of the consideration
doctrine was aimed at "the constitution of a calculating individual subject, whose
actions would be open to objective economic analysis, or economic rationality." Id. at
1877-78.
32

33

Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 2010

11

Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 40, Iss. 2 [2010], Art. 3

176

GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 40

time. 35 For example, Ballantine notes:
The underlying principle of consideration would seem to be
negative - a denial that ordinarily there is sufficient reason
36
why gratuitous promises should be enforced.

Ballantine's words reveal a search for "sufficient reason"
for enforcement and express the idea that without
consideration there is no such reason and therefore "a denial"
of enforcement follows. Yet, readers may ask why a "sufficient
reason" is being required from donative promises, while the
enforcement of bargained-for promises does not necessitate any
special "reason" beyond the making of a promise. Reading
more of Ballantine's text tells a bit more about the source of
reluctance as he explains:
From a nude pact no obligation arises. The courts have not
felt impelled to extend a remedy to one who seeks to get
something for nothing. 37

Ballantine's reasoning IS based on the lack of
consideration; on the notion that making a promise to give
something without receiving a reward in return can create
nothing and is no more than '~nude pact." Why does the law
have no "sufficient reason" for enforcement and why do the
courts feel "impelled?" At first glance, it seems as if the
reluctance had to do with the promisees who "seek to get
something for nothing." Yet, in an enforcement regime
promisees are reasonable to expect a fulfillment of promises
given to them regardless of whether they have given something
(of monetary value) in return. This suggests that the problem
may reside elsewhere. What may have made the enforcement
seem unreasonable is not so much receiving something for
nothing, but probably the opposite of it:
the giving of
"something for nothing."
In other words, the general
misunderstanding, suspicion and undervaluation of giving
behavior stand at the core of the classical decision to deny
enforcement from donative promises. From a logical point of
Id. at 1898 & n.51.
Henry Winthrop Ballantine, Mutuality and Consideration, 28 HARv. L. REV.
121, 121 (1914) (emphasis added).
37 Id. (emphasis added).
35

36
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view, enforcing a deal that is being perceived as "something for
nothing" is an irrational act. However, basing a special
unenforceability rule for donative promises on the lack of
"sufficient reason" to enforce them is quite a tautological
argument. The question is, therefore, what had the classical
theorists seen in gift promising that had made them worried
enough to engage in redefming the boundaries of contract law
in a way that leaves them out?
As, we shall now see, the classical resistance to donative
promises can be explained by at least three accompanying
ideological processes that took place at the times of the
establishment of classical contract doctrine.
Those three
developments turned any link between contract law and
intimate emotions into a threat to the status of contract law.
1.

Law as Science
[I]t [i]s indispensable to establish at least two things:
first, that law is a science ....38

The decisive quoted sentence, famously coming from
Christopher Columbus Langdell, is one key to understanding
the growing rejection of donative promises. Leading American
legal education into its golden days, Langdell worked first and
foremost to establish the profile of law-as-science. 39 Contract
law was one of the main vehicles through which Langdell made
his scientific point. As Langdell explained:
Law, considered as a science, consists of certain principles
and doctrines .... It seemed to me, therefore, to be possible

38 Christopher Columbus Langdell, Professor Langdell's Address in A RECORD OF
THE COMMEMORATION, NOVEMBER FIFTH TO EIGHTH, 1886, ON THE TwO HUNDRED AND
FIFTIETH ANNIVERSARY OF THE FOUNDING OF HARVARD COLLEGE 85 (1887), quoted in
GRANT GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT 109-10 (1974).
39 Langdell, one of the founding fathers of our jurisprudence, was an admired
Dean of Harvard Law School and the author of the first modern case book. Generally,
his belief in law as a rational science and his efforts to shape it as such were highly
influential. See Wai Chee Dimock, Deploying Law and Legal Ideas in Culture and
Society: Rules of Law, Laws of Science, 13 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 203, 204-05 (2001);
Brett G. ScharfIs, Law as Craft, 54 VAND. L. REV. 2245, 2257-58 (2001). In the
introduction to Langdell's book on contracts, he wrote, "It is indispensable to establish
at least two things, first that law is a science; secondly that all the available materials
of that science are contained in the printed books." See GILMORE, supra note 38, at 12;
Kreitner, supra note 26, at 1896.
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to take such a branch of the law as Contracts, for example, ..
. and to select, classify and arrange all the cases which had
contributed ... to the growth, development, or establishment
40
of any of its essential doctrines.

The choice of contract law to spread the "law as science"
message was not accidental, but deliberate. Contemporary
commentators do not always remember that contract, as a
distinct and paradigmatic field of law, was launched by
Langdell. 41 Writing the first modern casebook, devoted to a
field of law that was not yet defined, allowed Langdell more
freedom to construct a doctrine that would support his
argument that law is indeed a science. Importantly to our
focus on gifts, one third of the new book was dedicated to
establishing the consideration doctrine and at the same time
presented a prime example of "law as science."42
It
demonstrated that legal actors could construct doctrine by a
process as systematic and logical as that by which scientists
cull and analyze relevant data. As chemists work in their
laboratories, legal scientists work - as Langdell did - in the
law library,43 where they "select, classify and arrange all the
cases" in order to define or discover a more general principle or
doctrine. 44
The rebirth of consideration as a scientific doctrine and as
part of the broader Langdellian project of marketing the "law
as science" idea left little room for emotionally related promises
such as donative promises. To appreciate the conflict between
the emerging classical contract law, on the one hand, and giftpromising with its emotional associations, on the other, it is
important to understand that Langdell's definition of "science"
was especially unwelcoming to emotions. Not trained in any of

40

GILMORE, supra note 38, at 12 (emphasis added).

Id. at 9-14 (describing the emergence of Contract Law as a field of law not in
existence earlier and attributing the creation of "general theory of Contract" to
Langdell - who launched the idea - and his successors Holmes and Williston, who
"pieced it together").
42 Langdell's book had three chapters:
Mutual Assent, Consideration and
Conditional Contracts. See id. at 13.
43 The comparison of laboratories and law libraries belongs to Langdell himself,
who said, "The library is the proper workshop of professors and students alike; ... it is
to all of us all that the laboratories of the university are to the chemists and physicists .
. .. " See id. at 109 (quoting Langdell's speech from 1886).
4' Id.
41
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the then-acknowledged sciences, he held to a narrow
one
might say "impoverished" - view of science. 45 To him science
was an intellectual process of deduction and induction
resulting from textually based acts of reading and writing: the
ultimate expression of abstract logic and reason. Langdell saw
law as "as an entirely self-contained geometric system of
axioms, theorems, and proofs, generated by constructing the
simplest and most elegant internally consistent set of
principles ... ,,46 and, to him, logical consistency was what made
law scientific. Such a process has the advantage of producing a
set of concepts that in turn allow law to be and appear
"rational," i.e. reason-based and predictable rather than
arbitrary and uncontrolled. 47
Furthermore, as a person, Langdell has been described as
cold and distanced from his own emotions,48 which perhaps
made it natural for him to establish a doctrine that is aimed at
detaching contract law from emotion-laden contexts such as
promises to give gifts. It is of little wonder, therefore, that
Langdell produced a view of contract law as "a remote,
impersonal, bloodless abstraction,"49 and that eventually
classical doctrine proved hostile to the highly personal and
affectively motivated behavior of gift-promising.

2.

Objective Theory
The law moved from "subjective" to "objective,"

45 Dimock, supra note 39, at 215-18 (discussing critical views of Langdell's
perception of science).
46 Thomas Grey, Holmes and Legal Pragmatism, 41 STAN. L. REV. 787, 819
(1989).
47 As a result, one was to adhere to the rules almost regardless of the
consequences. Dimock, supra note 39, at 214. In a recent work, Professor Kimball has
suggested that in reality Langdell's mode of reasoning was far more complex and less
mathematical, but even according to his original analysis, Langdell is described as
avidly promoting an appearance oflaw as science for the sake of keeping and restoring
legal authority. See Bruce Kimball, LangdelJ on Contracts and Legal Reasoning:
Correcting the Holmesian Caricature, 25 LAW & RIST. REV. 345, 395 (2007).
48 Jerome Frank, Why Not a Clinical Lawyers-School? 81 U. PA. L. REV. 907, 908
(1933). Frank portrayed Langdell as a bizarre character with "an obsessive and almost
exclusive interest in books .... The lawyer-client relation, the numerous non-rational
factors involved in persuasion of a judge at a trial, the face-to-face appeals to the
emotions of juries, ... [were] virtually unknown (and [were] therefore meaningless) to
Langdell .... The so-called case system ... was the expression of the strange character
of a cloistered, retiring bookish man."
49 GILMORE, supra note 38, at 13.
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from "internal" to "external"
from "informal" to "formal',so

Langdell's contractual ideas were further developed by
Oliver Wendell Holmes. To the pillars of logic and rationality
coming from the "scientific" conceptualization of contract law
Holmes added a new emphasis on objectivity.5! The shift away
from subjectivity was quite remarkable: from the sixteenth to
the early nineteenth century, contract formation depended
upon the notion of a subjective "meeting of the minds."
However, by the middle of the nineteenth century, in the same
period that theorized the rejection of donative promises, "the
tide had turned in favor of an objective theory of contract.',s2
Importantly for our purposes, it was the newly defined
doctrine of consideration that facilitated the move from
subjectivity to objectivity. Langdell was probably the first to
make the effort to disconnect law from subjectivity, clarifying:
In order to eliminate the parties' subjective motives, . . .
''benefit to the promisor is irrelevant to the question of
whether a given thing can be made the consideration" and
that a "detriment to the promisee is a universal test of the
sufficiency of consideration.',53

Holmes had followed Langdell by distinguishing an
additional requirement as a condition for enforceability. Under
what is known as "the bargain theory," Holmes had clarified
that the mere presence of consideration will not suffice for
enforcement. To belong with contract law and to be enforced, a
promise should be bargained-for, i.e. induced by the
consideration. Combined, those two points present a legal
approach that disregards any subjective goal that may have
50 [d. at 41 (quoting Holmes's words in his famous 1888 printed collection of
lectures, "The Common Law").
61 Holmes is known for his critique of the Langellian idea of "law as science."
However, his analysis drew heavily on Langdell's logic-oriented analysis to the point of
"borrowing." See Kimball, supra note 47, at 367 ("One reason for the borrowing is that
Holmes needed the expertise, not having carefully studied the subject of contracts.
Another reason is that, in summer 1880, he was under 'deadline pressure for his
contract lectures' scheduled for late fall.").
62 See Allan Farnsworth, "Meaning" in the Law of Contracts, 76 YALE L.J. 939,
945 (1967).
63 Kimball, supra note 47, at 370 (citing CHRISTOPHER COLUMBUS LANGDELL, A
SUMMARY OF THE LAw OF CONTRACTS 71 (1880» (emphasis added).
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driven the promisor in making her promise. Instead, according
to the newly developed approach, all that should matter is the
presence of formal consideration, taken as an objective
measure. Naturally, such an approach distances contract law
from the parties' beliefs, intentions and feelings and shifts the
legal attention away from everything they wished for or had in
mind. It is almost needless to note how negative and
unwelcoming to donative promises contract doctrine became
after adopting such a formal and objective approach.

3.

Market Economy
The law of contract is, therefore, roughly
54
coextensive with the free market.

The exclusion of donative promises from contract law
should also be considered in relation to the major effort made
by classical contract theorists at the same time to connect their
(new) field with the market world and distance it from the
domestic arena. Creating an affinity between contract law and
the market was an independent goal that made contract law
far less receptive to donative promises, as the latter often
originated far from the core of the market and in any case were
clearly distinguishable from the stereotyped market behavior.
The conceptualization of the modern market as a social
institution remote from home is a relatively recent
development; the segregation is accepted as one of the main
consequences of the industrial revolution. 55 Historically, the
transition to an industrial society controlled by a market
economy has been an onerous process. It has brought about, to
name only a few obvious detriments, harsh competition,
instability, long hours of commute and work, growing social
alienation, and weakening of familial and communal
· syst ems. 56
support lve
The legal response to this harsh reality was part of a
larger ideological effort to reduce people's mounting anxieties
LAWRENCE FRIEDMAN, CONTRACT LAw IN AMERICA 20-24 (1965).
ADRIENNE RICH, OF WOMAN BORN: MOTHERHOOD AS EXPERIENCE AND
INSTITUTION 46 (1986); see also Hila Keren, Can Separate Be Equal? Intimate
Economic Exchange and the Cost ofBeing Special, 119 HARv. L. REV. F. 19 (2005).
56 See, e.g., Jay M. Feinman & Peter Gabel, Contract Law as Ideology, in THE
POLITICS OF THE LAW 497 (David Kairys ed., 3d ed. 1990).
54

55
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mainly by socializing them to develop a new belief in freemarket values. Under a wide, liberal pro-capitalist campaign,
aimed at selling the market idea with its laissez-faire
philosophy, it was claimed that what felt like alienation should
be accepted as valuable self-interested individualism and that
what was experienced as cruel competition is a logical and
rational tactic that would eventually lead to economic success.
In this nineteenth-century effort, classical contract law had an
important role to play: on the one hand, by increasingly
focusing on commercial transactions, it could signal a strong
belief in the centrality of the market. On the other hand, by
denying attention to "domesticity," it could portray the world of
family and friends as a warm shelter and a kind of consolation
to those daunted by the impersonal market.
One immediate, practical way to adjust the legal message
to the spirit of the period was by discriminating against
promises less associated with the values of the profit-oriented
and self-interested free market. The promises to give gifts,
with their altruistic nature and their affinity to the domestic
and personal spheres, were the first to stand in opposition to
the stereotype of market behavior and as such to invite
rejection. The process was figuratively described by Professor
Friedman as a process of exclusion:
Contract law expanded and narrowed its applicability to
human affairs primarily through a process of inclusion and
exclusion. The rules themselves changed less than the areas
covered by them. 57

In this atmosphere promises typical to the domestic,
relational and intimate setting became unworthy of legal
attention, underscoring the point that contract law's focus was
on the market. Accordingly, attaching separate legal meanings
to promises happening within the different spheres - the
enforcement of commercial (bargained-for) promises versus the
nonenforcement of non-economic (donative) promises - had an
important role. It worked in chorus with the ideology of the
day - both reflecting and reinforcing the newly drawn line
between the spheres. When courts and theorists had later to
explain the difference, their rhetoric highlighted a need to

57

FRIEDMAN, supra note 54, at 20-24 (emphasis added).
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respect the relational-domestic sphere and to protect it from
the coldness of the law. 58 However, as scholars in general and
feminists in particular have argued, such "protection" from law
actually worked in the opposite direction: it served to fortify
the market at the expense of other arenas of human activity
that were exposed to "lawlessness" and neglect. 59
4.

Summary

At the end of the nineteenth century and the beginning of
the twentieth century, the three separate ideas of linking law
with science, objectivism and the market had reinforced each
other and had resulted in an accumulative negative impact on
the legal status of donative promises. Unquestionably, the
leading classical contract theorists, such as Langdell, Holmes
and Williston, created and formulated a contract doctrine that
influenced generations to corne. At the beginning of the
twentieth century it was explicitly admitted that one of the
goals of this new contract doctrine was to educate lay people to
behave rationally.GO Promises to give that are not supported by
expectations of tangible consideration were perceived as totally
irrational and, in the spirit of the time, were denied the
support of contract law and deemed unenforceable. However,
the exclusion that resulted from a set of nineteenth-century
ideologies survived the changes that were brought by the
twentieth century, and new justifications for the
unenforceability rule began to emerge. The corning section
moves from the past to the present to discuss those more-recent
explanations.
58 In the famous case of Balfour v. Balfour, the court said: "Agreements such as
these are outside the realm of contracts altogether. The co=on law does not regulate
the form of agreements between spouses. Their promises are not sealed with seals and
sealing wax. The consideration that really obtains for them is that natural love and
affection which counts for so little in these cold Courts .... In respect of these promises
each house is a domain into which the King's writ does not seek to run, and to which
his officers do not seek to be admitted." Balfour v. Balfour, [1919] 2 K.B. 571, 579.
59 MaIjorie M. Shultz, The Gendered Curriculum: Of Contracts and Careers, 77
IOWAL. REV. 55, 58-59 (1991).
60 Amy H. Kastely, Out of the Whiteness: On Raced Codes and White Race
Consciousness in Some Tort, Criminal and Contract Law, 63 U. CIN. L. REV. 269,301 &
n.115 (1994) (maintaining that "Justice Holmes said that citizens should be educated to
'rational' behavior and racial division" and quoting him as saying in one of his public
speeches, "If I am right it will be a slow business for our people to reach rational views,
assuming that we are allowed to work peaceably to that end.").
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CURRENT VIEWS

With some important exceptions,61 most of the
contemporary works that have explored the classical
unenforceability of donative promises have ended up offering
arguments in support of the status quo that are grounded in
the disadvantages of enforcement. Even scholars who have
admitted the value of legal enforcement of donative promises
were reluctant to go as far as to recommend a reform and a
move to an enforcement regime. 62 How much of such enduring
resistance to the enforcement of donative promises is still
connected to their association with the relational and affective
aspects of life?
1.

The Anti-Enforcement Arguments

Along the years many arguments against enforcement
have been raised, ranging from the most procedural to the
more substantive. Yet, each of the many anti-enforcement
arguments shares the assumption of difference. donative
promises are so different from "normal" promises that the
"regular" norm of enforceability cannot fit them. The literature
concerning the unenforceability rule is vast and elaborate and
does not seem to call for yet another summary. Alternatively,
the chart below and the following analysis are aimed at
reclassifYing the leading existing arguments against
enforceability of donative promises and connecting them to the
traditional resistance toward the emotions.
The main
arguments against enforcement can be divided into those that
are made on behalf of the world of contracts and those that are
61 See, e.g., Jane B. Baron, Gifts, Bargains and Form, 64 IND. L. J. 155 (1989);
Mark B. Wessman, Recent Defenses of Consideration: Commodification and
Collaboration, 41 IND. L. REV. 9 (2008); Carol M. Rose, Giving, Trading, Thieving and
Trusting: How and u-71y Gifts Become Exchanges and (More Importantly) Vice Versa,
44 FLA. L. REV. 295 (1992); Carol M. Rose, Giving Some Back -- A Reprise, 44 U. FLA. L.
REV. 365 (1992).
62 A good example is a recent analysis by Professor Prentice, who has used
Behavioral Law and Economics to illuminate the behavior of giving gifts and promising
to give them. Although Professor Prentice is quite sympathetic to gift-giving and
clearly appreciates its logic, he still concludes that even his analysis does not call for
legal reform. Robert A. Prentice, "Law &" Gratuitous Promises, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV.
881 (2007). See also Richard Posner, Gratuitous Promises in Economics and Law, 6 J.
LEGAL STUD. 411 (1977); Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, Enforcing Promises: An
Examination ofthe Basis of Contracts, 89 YALE L.J. 1261 (1980).
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made on behalf of the world of gift.
summarized as follows:

185

They can then be

A.
Protecting the World of Contract

B.
Protecting the World of Gift

1)

Donative promises are minor and
not important.

2)

Donative
promises
are
too
ambiguous.
Donative promises are impulsive
not
well
considered
and
(impulsive).
Donative promises are subjective,
hard to prove, and easy to fabricate
63
or manipulate.

A risk of imposed contract
(donative promises are not
intended to be legally binding).
A risk of damaging the world of
gift.

3)

4)

Examination of the chart can highlight an interesting
phenomenon: the arguments made from the perspective of the
world of contract, while appearing to care about the value of
this world, are in fact arguments regarding the problematic
nature of the gift. Conversely, the arguments coming from the
standpoint of the world of gift, while seeming to worry about
this world, are in reality arguments about the nature of the
opposite world, that of contract. Despite Eisenberg's rhetoric,
it also seems evident that what he has entitled as the "world of
contract" can be more precisely described as the "world oflaw."
For example, looking at cell A(3) it seems clear that it is the
law (of evidence), and not the contract, that has problems of
proof. Similarly, as far as cell B(l) is concerned it is law rather
than contract that is imposing itself when there is no indication
of intention to be legally bound. Replacing the term "contract"
with the term "law" can be a revealing exercise as it uncovers
some of the tautological character of the arguments against
enforceability. One may ask how the difference between the
world of law and the world of gift can offer a satisfactory
justification for the refusal oflaw to apply itself to gifts.
The chart enables us to see that six main parameters are

63

Eisenberg, supra note 6, at 827.
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used to make the case for a fundamental difference between
donative promises and commercial promises.
Gifts are
described as different from contracts by size [A(1)), clarity
[A(2)], deliberativeness [A(3)], provability [A( 4)], legal intention
[B(l)] and vulnerability to law [B(2)]. Nevertheless, those six
parameters produce no clear line between the two groups of
promises. Promises from both groups often reflect the same
dollar value, enjoy similar - written - clarity, are based on
analogous deliberativeness, present similar amenability to
proof, and reflect a comparable intention to be legally binding.
What remains is only the question whether the touch of law is
going to damage the world of gift [B(2)].64 To return to the five
other parameters, it seems clear that promises from the "world
of contract" and promises from the "world of gift" can be so
similar that scholarly insistence on differentiation becomes
baffling. Is it possible, then, that in fact these are not the
relevant sources of difference or parameters for comparison?
The standard arguments against donative promises which suggest the impulsiveness, ambiguity, and unreliability
of such promises - seem to apply less to actual examples of
such promises (which can be, as shown in the case of Levine v.
Barton,65 very deliberative and carefully defined) and more
relevant to the emotions that are presumed to animate and
underlie them. According to common myths, emotions - which
are often, and erroneously, treated in the aggregate - are
conceived as impulsive, transient, immature, and generally
inferior as compared to deliberative, mature cognitive thinking.
Such a view is prevalent among jurists, who have frequently
contrasted such traits with their idealized view of the legal
world. Richard Posner, for example, has bluntly argued:
The less experienced a person is at reasoning through a
particular kind of problem, the more likely that person is to
"react emotionally," that is, to fall back on a more primitive
mode of reaching a conclusion, the emotional. . . . Emotions,
like sex, are something that we have in common with
animals, who, having smaller cortexes than humans, rely
more heavily than humans do on emotions to guide their

64

See infTa Part III.

65 Levine v. Estate of Barton (In re Barton), No. W2004-02913-COA-R3-CV, 2005
Tenn. App. LEXIS 825 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 28, 2005).
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actions. 66
The denial of legal recognition of promises to give gifts may
thus be seen as a variation of the old resistance to the place of
emotions in legal decisionmaking. Clearly, to some legal minds
the status of contact law is still threatened by an association
with the image of the emotions, much as it was in the days of
Langdell.
Taken together, the four arguments on the left side of the
chart seem to protect contracts by portraying them as rational
and not "emotional" (to use Posner's derogatory term). That
message is communicated by rejecting donative promises which
function in this context as a symbol of emotionalism. By
refusing to enforce ostensibly impulsive promises, for example,
the law denies its own uncontrolled dimensions and
underscores its attributes of objectivity and reason. Such a
structure suggests that the line between commercial promises
and donative promises, and the following contract/gift
dichotomy, are in fact rooted in a deeper dichotomy between
law with its veneration of reason, on the one hand, and
emotion, on the other.
A similar reference to the dichotomies of contract/gift and
reason/emotion is more directly made in the two arguments on
the other side of the chart. While the question whether a
promisor of a gift meant to be legally bound by her promise is a
factual one, the argument that donative promises generally
lack such intention seems to rest on an assumption that the
affective origins of such promises render them innately nonlegal. The coming section discusses the dichotomous view
created by these arguments against enforceability, to better
understand what stands at the core ofthe durable resistance to
donative promises.

2.

The Dichotomies in Con text

The dichotomies of contract/gift and reason/emotion that
animate the enduring separation between bargained-for
promises and donative promises should not be seen in isolation.
They follow from and rely on a series of other fundamental

66 Richard A. Posner, Emotions vs. EmotionaHsm in Law, in THE PASSIONS OF
LAw 309, 311 (Susan A. Bandes ed., 1999).
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dichotomies that shape the liberal world and, working together,
they all reinforce each other to create a reality almost
axiomatic. Bargained-for promises are usually made in a
commercial sphere and away from the domestic arena; their
content is tangible, and-far from being elusiv~they have
economic worth and not some personal value; this worth is
definite and not vague, as it is perceived as being objectively
dictated by the public market and not as subjectively
determined by a private individual promisee; bargained-for
promises are assumed to be a product of arm ~ length
negotiation rather than of intimate and informal
communications; those promises are
motivated by
individualism and self-interest and far less by communitarism
and caring for others; and, having all those characteristics,
bargained-for promises are often believed to be rational and not
so emotional. Importantly, as one may immediately notice,
bargained-for promises are much closer to the conventional
image of law, where "reason in all its splendor,,67 supposedly
preSl'des. 68
This concert of dichotomies has a powerful effect. It makes
the division appear natural and inevitable, and it conceals the
intentional normative choice that courts have made. It also
produces the strongest anti-enforcement argument left on the
table in contemporary debates - Eisenberg's metaphor of two
opposed worlds. Such a strong metaphor neatly captures the
idea that, due to many dichotomies working in chorus, we are
witnessing a gap far deeper than what can result from a mere
difference - one which cannot, and, more significantly, should
not be bridged.
It is important to note that the "two worlds" idea
essentially encompasses three layers of assumptions about
human beings, their psychology and behavior, and the link
between their lives and legal norms. At the first and most
immediate level it suggests a substantial difference between
the worlds. The two types of promises, it is argued, are
dramatically different internally and externally. Internally,
the promises differ in what motivates the promisor. While

See Owen M. Fiss, Reason in All Its Splendor, 56 BROOK. L. REV. 789 (1990).
Note the correlation of all these dichotomies to the basic dichotomy of man v.
woman. Bargained-for promises fit the masculine image while donative promises have
qualities usually attached to the feminine.
67

68
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bargained-for promises are made out of self-interest to earn a
tangible reward, promises to gift result from the opposite
motivation: an other-oriented decision to give up something
valuable without expecting a reward. Externally, the entire
context within which the promises are made is utterly
disparate. Both in terms of location and atmosphere, the two
sets of promises emerge in highly differentiated spheres - one
in the market and the other far away from the market, one
could say at "home."
Such a stark difference is then followed by a seconct less
recognized,69 layer of rivalry and mutual threat. The worlds
are so different that any connection between them may
endanger their existence. The point, which may be called "the
contamination risk," is not only that the worlds are separated
but that they should remain apart to avoid damage. Professor
Eisenberg is vividly making the point by describing the danger
to the world of gift:
[M]uch of the world of gift is driven by affective
considerations like love, affection, friendship, gratitude and
comradeship. That world would be impoverished if it were to
70
be collapsed into the world of contract.

In the third layer the gap between the "opposed worlds"
has a vertical dimension of hierarchy. the worlds are not only
different and hostile but also unequal in their status. This
vertical structure is quite expected since whenever a
dichotomous separation is defined, the human instinct
responds by establishing a hierarchy.71

69 Highlighting this under-acknowledged point is especially important because it
tends to be more resilient to critique. See, e.g., Joan Williams & Viviana Zelizer, To
Commodify or Not To Commodify: That Is Not the Question, in RETHINKING
COMMODIFICATION 362, 364 (Martha M. Ertman & Joan C. Williams eds., 2005).
70 Eisenberg, supra note 6, at 847 (emphasis added).
71 This was, for example, the ground for the political and legal rejection of
"separate but equal" throughout the era of Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483
(1954). According to postmodern philosophy the move from difference and separation
to hierarchy is automatic and unavoidable. Once the human mind is differentiating
experience, it immediately and compulsively turns to classify them as superior and
inferior.
See, e.g., GARY MINDA, POSTMODERN LEGAL MOVEMENTS: LAW AND
JURISPRUDENCE AT CENTURY'S END, 117-18 (1995). For a similar point made with
regard to the rejection of exchanges made in the intimate sphere, see Hila Keren, Can
Separate Be Equal? Intimate Economic Exchange and the Cost of Being Special, 119
HARv. L. REV. F. 19 (2005).
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Professor Eisenberg's professed object of protecting the
beauties of the world of gift from the impoverishing impact of
the world of contract suggests a greater appreciation and care
for the special world of gifts. 72 However, in reality the rule of
unenforceability produces the opposite hierarchy, which favors
the world of contract. While it seems true that the rule aspired
to sustain or enhance a simple separation between the two
groups of promises, its vindication of that goal was not neutral
in its effects. By excluding donative promises and denying
their contractual validity the law has pronounced them inferior
to "normal" promises, those made for recognized consideration
and outside the familial/relational context. The legal refusal to
enforce donative promises simultaneously serves as a sign of a
general social devaluation of the world of gifts and an
independent cause for such marginality.73
As long as commercial promises are considered as purely
logical acts, and donative promises are seen as emotional acts,
the above hierarchy will continue to be highly impoverishing.
If this is true, then the harm can be mitigated only by blurring
the lines between reason-directed and affect-motivated
exchanges. To accomplish that, it is essential to put aside the
old assumptions about the emotions.

3.

Law-and-the-Emotions Ideas Applied

As we have so far seen, the deliberate distancing of
donative promises from contract law is a product of the
fundamental belief in the estrangement of law and the
emotions. It is at this point that the pioneering works done in
the emerging field of "law and the emotions" offer a strong
challenge to contract doctrine. Those works introduced the
idea that emotions have a vital role to play in the legal world.
This radical claim confronted a long intellectual tradition that
dichotomized reason and emotion,74 and which construed legal
72 See also Posner's argument that donative promises do not call for much legal
enforcement, as they can rely on moral sanctions that are far less effective in the
commercial world. Roberto Mangabeira Unger, The Critical Legal Studies Movement,
96 HARv. L. REV. 561, 622 (1983) (noting that contract law singles out the realm oflove
and affection for special treatment, based on the assumption that family and friendship
"neither need much law nor are capable of tolerating it").
73 Jane B. Baron, Gifts, Bargains and Form, 64 IND. L. J. 155, 180-81, 189 (1989).
74 See, e.g., Angela P. Harris & Marjorie M. Shultz, "A(nother) Critique of Pure
Reason": Toward Civic Virtue in Legal Education, 45 STAN. L. REV. 1773, 1775 (1993)
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thought as a professionally instilled cognitive process that
could be powerfully unsettled by affective response. Law, it
has been recently argued, is infused with emotions and has
immense influence over people's emotions.
Contrary to
traditional belief, law cannot do justice without paying close
attention to the affective dimension of life. Without taking
emotions seriously, without understanding what may create
and direct human feelings, and without dealing with the
emotional consequences of legal actions, no "rational"
decisionmaking is possible. Just as individuals without access
to affective knowledge ("emotional intelligence") are limited by
having misguided judgment, so too is the law. Affect-oriented
understanding is vital, and the entire legal enterprise is at risk
of being irrelevant and even harmful without it.
From the perspective of the first current of law-and-theemotions scholarship, with its forceful call for legal attention to
the emotions, the legal decision not to enforce promises to gift
due to their affective "nature" is extremely problematic. After
years of loyalty to a legal regime that is premised on an
erroneous conception of the emotions, it is imperative to engage
in an effort to better understand the affective structure of
giving behavior, a proposition that is further discussed in the
next Part.

II.

INVESTIGATION OF EMPATHY AND GRATITUDE

A.

EMPATHY AND ALTRUISM: GENERAL REVIEW

This Part seeks to better understand the affective
dimensions of gift promising. A promise to give a gift to
another appears to be an unselfish gesture that suggests care
for the promisee's welfare. On the face of things, it is an act of
altruism: the promisor does not require any material reward
from the promisee, and the decision to make the promise
cannot be explained by traditional cost-benefit analysis.
Earlier we have seen how contract law treats such altruistic
behavior with great suspicion, as it directly conflicts with its
rational-choice theory, according to which people are motivated
by the desire to maximize their economic self-interests. But
("Law schools operate at the junction of the academy and the legal profession. Both
realms tend to polarize reason and emotion and to elevate reason.").
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perplexity in the face of altruism is not unique to law: such
other-oriented behavior, sometimes also referred to as "help,"
or "care,,,75 has been a source of puzzlement in other disciplines
too. Darwin, for example, was driven "half-mad" by the
challenge that the altruistic behavior of bees in hives presented
to his theory of evolution by natural selection. 76 The altruistic
behavior of the sterile bees who risk their lives in defense of
the hive "would seem to be precisely the sort of trait that
natural selection should operate against, and Darwin knew
it.'077 Scholarly efforts to explain the altruistic behavior of
animals and human beings has resulted in a monumental
literature.
As with Darwin in biology, anthropologists,
psychologists, philosophers and other scholars have been
challenged by patterns of behavior that do not seem to follow
egoistic patterns. Is it possible that there is something beyond
"The Selfish Gene,,?78
One skeptical explanation is that what seems to be
altruistic behavior is in fact an egoistic pattern in disguise.
This approach, sometimes called "universal egoism," denies the
possibility of "true altruism" or "pure altruism" and argues that
the motivation for any behavior arises from the exclusive
prospect of self-benefit.79 For example, we help a family
member not because we care for her, but because we expect to
benefit from keeping a good relationship with her, or because
we anticipate a counter-favor of similar or larger value. The
75 Moving on from the discussion of legal doctrine to the investigation of
emotions requires some change of tone or tuning of language. In many non-legal
disciplines the state of not knowing, or not knowing for sure, is much more typical and
tolerable, and one of the consequences is that terminology and arguments tend to be
more open-ended. Furthermore, the interdisciplinary nature of this investigation
project demands navigation between different concepts while bridging gaps between
dissimilar academic styles. It requires, for example, a discussion of results of a
psychological experiment in concert with findings from brain-lab research and
articulations of philosophical arguments. To enable free motion in such a diverse
scholarly space, some preparation is in order.
76 LEE ALAN DUGATKIN, THE ALTRmsM EQUATION: SEVEN SCIENTISTS SEARCH
FOR THE ORIGINS OF GOODNESS 5-6 (2006).
77 [d. at 2.
78 RICHARD DAWKINS, THE SELFISH GENE (1976). Professor Dugatkin has said
that Dawkins chose the metaphor to emphasize that genes that code for any trait that
benefits the species as a whole are doomed for not maximizing their ("selfish") chances
of being passed to the next generation. See DUGATKIN, supra note 76, at 4.
79 C. Daniel Batson, Nadia Ahmad, David A. Lishner & Jo-Ann Tsang, Empathy
and Altruism, in THE HANDBOOK OF POSITIVE PSYCHOLOGY 485-86 (C. R. Snyder &
Shane J. Lopez eds., 2002).
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universal-egoism approach has had a vast influence over many
disciplines of scholarship: at least one scholar admitted that
"[t]he flint-eyed researcher fears no greater humiliation than to
have called some action altruistic, only to have a more
sophisticated colleague later demonstrate that it was self•
"80
servmg.
An opposing argument is that altruism does truly exist,
and human behavior cannot always be explained by selfish
motives. At least outside the law, there appears to be a
"paradigm shift" away from the earlier position that egoistic
motives are the true explanation for every form of behavior
that appears to be altruistic. 81 The more recent view is that
true altruism is an integral part of human nature. 82 This is not
a universal approach but a more pluralistic one: it
acknowledges the place of self interest but also grants that true
altruism is "within the human repertoire"83 and has important
value for both individuals and society.
To return to the legal question of donative promises,
accepting the universal-egoism approach could have made the
argument in favor of enforceability both easy and immediate.
If every promise of a gift is actually a selfish transaction in
disguise, then there should be no reason to distinguish these
promises from their more conventional contractual
counterparts or to see them as "unreasonable." According to
the universal-egoism approach, Ballantine was wrong when he
wrote that a gratuitous promise is about giving "something for
nothing,',s4 because there is always "something" that is being
expected by the promisor in return for her promise.
Furthermore, the (selfish) benefits that motivated the promisor
ROBERT H. FRANK, PASSIONS WITHIN REASON 21 (1988).
Jane Allyn Piliavin & Hong-Wen Charng, Altruism: A Review of Recent
Theory and Research, 16 ANN. REV. SOC. 27, 27 (1990). "The flint-eyed researcher fears
no greater humiliation than to have called some action altruistic, only to have a more
sophisticated colleague later demonstrate that it was self-serving." FRANK, supra note
80, at 21.
80

81

However, this simple strategy of reducing all pro-social behavior to a more or
less sophisticated form of egoism is nowadays much less popular than it used to
be. Psychologists have collected convincing evidence for the existence of a
genuine feeling of empathy, i.e., concern for others, in human beings.
For additional discussion of this point, see infra, Part II.B.
Batson et aI., supra note 79, at 486.
84 Henry W. Ballantine, Mutuality and Consideration, 28 HARV. L. REV. 121, 121
(1914).
82

83
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can also satisfy the consideration requirement as they
represent the required benefit to the promisor. Even the fear
of contaminating the ''world of gift," which was raised by
Professor Eisenberg, becomes irrelevant if one believes that in
reality there is no such beautiful and vulnerable world that is
moved by the care of human beings for each other. The egoistic
approach cannot therefore offer justification for a rule of
unenforceability.
The status of promises to gift appears different, of course,
if one pursues the more plural approach. In recognizing that at
least partial altruism is possible, and may be elicited by a
significant, genuine kind of other-oriented motivation, this
approach suggests that the question of donative promises is
more complex. It demands a better understanding of altruistic
behavior and the emotions that may instigate it.
From early philosophers such as David Hume86 and Adam
Smith,86 to current psychologists such as Martin Hoffman87 and
Daniel Batson,88 scholars have pointed to the set of emotions,
loosely captured by the word "empathy" and sometimes jointly
called the "empathetic emotions," as the possible basis for the
altruistic behavior.89
Under different names, including
"empathy," "sympathy," "compassion," "tenderness," "pity," and
the like (hereinafter termed empathy or empathic emotion),
scholars have emphasized an emotional response that is
sincerely other-oriented and is elicited by and congruent with
the perceived welfare of someone else. 90 In recent years,
scholars have become deeply engaged in researching empathy,
85 DAVID HUME, A TREATISE ON HUMAN NATURE 316 (Selby-Bigge ed., 1896) ("No
quality of human nature is more remarkable . . . than that propensity we have to
sympathize with others."); DAVID HUME, AN ENQUffiY CONCERNING THE PRINCIPLES OF
MORALS 90,92 (App. 2) (Tom L. Beauchamp ed., Oxford University Press 1998) (1751)
(rejecting the argument that "all benevolence is mere hypocrisy" and pointing to the
existence of affections of "love, friendship, compassion [and] gratitude.").
86 ADAM SMITH, THE THEORY OF MORAL SENTIMENTS 1 (Anthony Finley 1817)
(1759) (writing about "sympathy" and opening the discussion by arguing: "How selfish
soever man may be supposed, there are evidently some principles in his nature, which
interest him in the fortune of others, and render their happiness necessary to him,
though he derives nothing from it, except the pleasure of seeing it. ").
87 MARTIN L. HOFFMAN, EMPATHY AND MORAL DEVELOPMENT: IMPLICATIONS FOR
CARING AND JUSTICE (2000).
88 C. DANIEL BATSON, THE ALTRUISM QUESTION (1991) (reviewing the literature
and suggesting the Empathy-Altruism Hypothesis).
89 Batson et al., supra note 79, at 486.
90
Id.
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animated and assisted by two important developments. The
first is a growing interest in positive emotions, and a
corresponding investigation into their individual and social
value and importance. The second is a body of technological
advances that have allowed neuroscientists to link feelings of
empathy with certain recognizable activity in the brain. 91
In many of the works dedicated to empathy, the line
between altruistic behavior and the emotion(s) that motivate it
has been blurred. In some cases, no clear distinction has been
made between feeling empathy and acting in an altruistic way.
Some theorists define the empathic emotion itself as including
several dimensions, the last of which is motivational and is
taken as leading directly to a behavioral effort to help or
benefit another.92 Others, often more focused on altruism, seem
to view the altruistic motivation as an external result of
experiencing empathetic emotions. In any case, there seems to
be considerable evidence that feeling empathy increases
altruistic behavior. 93 The Empathy-Altruism Hypothesis of
Batson is a frequently cited explanation for the direct and
causal connection between the empathic emotion and the
readiness to help others. Batson argued that, from traditional
philosophy to recent psychology, "the most frequently
mentioned possible source of altruistic motivation is an otheroriented emotional reaction to seeing another person in need.,,94
He then suggested a model that outlines three paths that lead
from empathy to the end result of helping behavior. Two of the
three paths are indeed induced by empathy but are still
egoistic and therefore - as in the universal egoism analysis point toward treating donative promises as bargains. If, for
example, as Batson's model suggests, one may selfishly decide

91 See, e.g., Stephanie D. Preston & Frans B. M. de Waal, Empathy: Its Ultimate
and Proximate Bases, 25 BEHAV. & BRAIN SCI. 1 (2002), and the many responses to that
article written by leading scholars in the field of empathy and published by the same
journal in the same volume.
92 See, e.g., ROBERT C. SOLOMON, A PASSION FOR JUSTICE 230-31 (1990) (arguing
that compassion is not just a feeling but also a motive for acting).
93 See, e.g., R. Buck & P. Ginsburg, Emotional Communication and Altruism:
The Communicative Gene Hypothesis, in ALTRUISM: REVIEW OF PERSONALITY AND
SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY: VOL. 12 149 (M. S. Clark ed., 1991); Nancy Eisenberg & Paul
Miller, The Relation of Empathy to Pro-Social and Related Behaviors, 101 PSYCHOL.
BULL. 91 (Jan. 1987).
94 Batson et al., supra note 79, at 486.
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to help in order to get a personal reward,95 then the way to
finding consideration that will allow enforcement does not
seem to be too long. The third path in Batson's model is the
empathy-altruism hypothesis, "the hypothesis that feeling
empathy for a person in need evokes altruistic motivation to
help that person,,96 and that "the greater the empathic emotion
the greater the altruistic motivation.'097
It is beyond the scope of this Article to catalogue the
knowledge gained in a range of disciplines concerning empathy
and its role in motivating altruistic behavior. Instead, the
framework of law and the emotions will be used. Focusing on
the "law" component, the structure of the discussion will follow
the leading legal arguments against enforcement. Then, these
arguments will be linked (the "and" component) to the emotions
throughout exploration of some relevant sections of the nonlegal understandings of empathy.98 As we shall now see, the
non-legal information tends to undermine the common
objections to enforceability.
B.

EMPATHY IS NATURAL

Donative promises seem to conflict with the concept of "the
Selfish Gene" and with the widespread assumption that people
are motivated only by their self interests and that true
altruism is an illusion. This conflict was transformed by some
jurists into a general disbelief toward donative promises and a
grave suspicion that they are "exceptionally easy to fabricate.'099
In contrast to such disbelief, non-legal research consistently
suggests reasons to trust such promises as natural and
95 This is part of Batson's first path. Id. In addition to an anticipated reward
and included in the first path, one may selfishly help to avoid a sanction. Id. The
second path is helping out of a selfish goal of reducing the distress caused to the helper
from witnessing the suffering of another. Id. This path may lead to helping behavior,
but it may also lead to detachment that seeks to avoid the situation altogether (no
helping behavior). Id.
96 C. DANIEL BATSON, THE ALTRUISM QUESTION 74 (1991).
97 Batson et al., supra note 79, at 488.
98 This pragmatic choice will admittedly leave out some important questions that
are the main focus of empathy scholars but I hope that it will contribute more to the
subject at hand.
99 Eisenberg, supra note 6, at 827 & n.22. (presenting the common argument
that "donative promises are exceptionally easy to fabricate" as made in Lon L. Fuller,
Consideration and Form, 41 U. COLO. L. REV. 799 (1941), and in other works cited in
note 22 of his article).
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authentic. For example, Dacher Keltner has compellingly
argued that as human beings we have a compassionate
instinct, which manifests itself in many nonverbal and
spontaneous manners: through the expressions of our face, the
beat of our heart, the levels of our hormones and even the
activity in our brain. lOo Apparently, young children show a
particular facial expression (oblique eyebrows, concerned gaze)
when they empathize with another. Similarly, the heart rate of
people who feel empathy goes below its baseline level and the
levels of a special hormone (Oxytocin) increases when people
behave in a caring way. And, perhaps most exciting, the brain
shows demonstrable neurological reaction in response to others
- both relatives and strangers - who are in need. Furthermore,
the empathic emotion is not only deeply rooted in the brain and
in the body but can also be communicated, i.e., both expressed
and understood, without words, by a simple touch of hands. 101
This last point suggests that the empathic emotion is
something people are capable of feeling, conveying and
comprehending even before language or texts, i.e., as a part of
human nature.
The inclination to feel and show empathy gains additional
support from scholarship on moral development, which
demonstrates that feelings of empathy are not only natural but
also inevitable. Psychologist Martin Hoffman has pointed to
the existence of five distinct modes of empathic arousal.
According to Hoffman the first three modes are "preverbal,
automatic and essentially involuntary.,,102 Recognizing those
involuntary modes here is important not because they can
explain a decision to give a gift or promise it. They cannot.
Those three preverbal modes are apparently too automatic and
too cognitively underdeveloped to lead to such behavior.
Recognizing those involuntary modes is important, however,
since it shows that humans are built in such a way that not

100 Dacher Keltner,
The Compassionate Instinct, in THE COMPASSIONATE
INSTINCT: THE SCIENCE OF HUMAN GOODNESS 9-11 (Dacher Keltner, Jeremy Adam
Smith, & Jason Marsh eds., 2010); Stephanie D. Preston and Frans B. M. de Waal,
Empathy: Its Ultimate and Proximate Bases, 25 BEHAV. & BRAIN SCI. 1 (2002).
101 Id. at 12 (describing an experiment in which two strangers were put in a room
where they were separated by a barrier, and reporting that "people in these
experiments reliably identified compassion ... from the touches to their forearm.").
102 MARTIN L. HOFFMAN, EMPATHY AND MORAL DEVELOPMENT: IMPLICATIONS FOR
CARING AND JUSTICE 5 (2000).
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only enables them to emotionally respond to the needs of others
but also compels them to do SO.103
Finally, the conceptualization of empathy and altruistic
motives as normal and natural can also get support from
looking at the flip side of the coin. In the world of psychiatry,
which struggles with defining "abnormalities," the inability to
feel empathy and/or to communicate such emotion is a
significant indication of certain personality disorders. The
symptoms of a narcissist personality disorder, as a prime
example, are defined by the most recent Diagnostic and
Statistical Manual (DMS) - IV and they explicitly include "lack
of empathy.,,104 As Professor Nussbaum reminds us, having
empathy is the normal state while "typically we will be right to
without
empathy frightening
and
find
a
person
psychopathic. ,,105
C.

EMPATHY IS COGNITIVE

As mentioned earlier, one explanation for the
unenforceability of donative promises is that they are
.
l'
'11conSI'dere d t 0 b e t 00 lmpu
Slve, 106 ras hIy rna d e, 107 1
considered,108 and lacking proper deliberation. 109
These
assumptions are rarely explained, but rather are presented as
if they reflect a basic truth, one that does not call for
demonstration or proof.
As a threshold matter, these
assumptions rely on an image of emotions as if they were

103

I d.

104 P. J. Watson, Stephanie O. Grisham, Marjorie V. Trotter & Michael D.
Biderman, Narcissism and Empathy:
Validity Evidence for the Narcissistic
Personality Inventory, 48 J. PENS. AsSESS. 301 (June 1984).
105 MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, UPHEAVALS OF THOUGHT:
THE INTELLIGENCE OF
EMOTIONS 334 (2001).
106 Lon L. Fuller, Consideration and Form, 41 COLUM. L. REV. 799, 799 (1941)
("Again, it is said that enforcement is denied gratuitous promises because such
promises are often made impulsively and without proper deliberation.").
107 Geoffrey Mead, Free Acceptance: Some Further Consideration, 105 L.Q.R. 460,
466 (1989) ("The courts will not normally enforce a gratuitous promise unless the
promise is made under seal. A plausible rationale of this rule is that there is thought to
be a risk that gratuitous promises might be made rashly and on the spur of the
moment, without careful thought.") (emphasis added).
108 ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS 52 (3d ed. 1999).
109 Andrew Kull, Reconsidering Gratuitous Promises, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 39, 53-54
(1992) ("[G]ratuitous promises in general are made without proper deliberations .... ")
(emphasis added).
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impulses, an image whose general flaws were discussed earlier.
Yet, with regard to the connection between the emotions and
law, the more central question is whether the concrete emotion
of empathy, which is considered to be the chief motivator for
gift promising, truly fits with such an impulsive image.
Recent years have seen a major change in the way scholars
view emotions. The view of emotions as connected to cognition
- as shaped by thoughts and as influencing judgments - has
been ascendant in many recent efforts to theorize the
emotions. 110 Academic and more-popular works reflect a
growing understanding that, without the information coming
from our emotions, no intelligent decisionmaking is even
possible. l l l Now supported by contemporary research of the
brain, this emerging view departs sharply from the impulsive
profile assumed by scholarship.112 As Kahan and Nussbaum
make clear, such cognitive notions should be understood
against the backdrop of a long debate occurring in different
disciplines about the nature of emotions. What they call "the
mechanistic view" holds that "emotions are forces more or less
devoid of thought or perception" and that emotions are
"impulses or surges."l13 Obviously, that is the view which
correlates with the current resistance to the enforcement of
donative promises, which are accepted as affectively motivated.
The opposite view, often named "the evaluative view,,,114 sees
the lines between emotions and cognition as blurred: it
emphasizes that emotions are shaped by preexisting cognitive
appraisals and - at the same time - shape people's (cognitive)
r.
·
.
evaIua t IOns
gomg
lorward .115
110 Richard
Lazarus, Thoughts on the Relations Between Emotions and
Cognition, 37(9) A.\1. PSYCHOL. 1019, (1982).
111

DANIEL GOLEMAN, EMOTIONAL INTELLIGENCE: WHY IT CAN MATTER MORE

THAN IQ (1996).
112 KEITH OATLEY, DACHER KELTNER & JENNIFER M. JENKINS, UNDERSTANDING
EMOTIONS 21 (2d ed. 2006) (explaining that "[mlost researchers now assume that
emotions follow appraisals of an event, a view similar to Aristotle's idea of emotions as
evaluations").
113 Dan M. Kahan & Martha C. Nussbaum, Two Conceptions of Emotion in
Criminal Law, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 269, 277-78 (1996). For a more elaborate discussion
by Nussbaum, see MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, UPHEAVALS OF THOUGHT: THE
INTELLIGENCE OF EMOTIONS 19-79 (2001).
114 Kahan & Nussbaum, supra note 113, at 277-78.
115 Law-and-the-emotions scholars have used those ideas to argue that if some
emotions have the structure of cognition, and cognition itself often functions in an
intuitive, affective way, then bringing the two together by recognizing the place of
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In Descartes' Error, for example, Antonio Damasio points
to the imprecise and misleading character of the
reason/emotion dichotomy.1I6 To him emotions are forms of
intelligent awareness: "just as cognitive as other percepts."l17
Once the sharp distinction is removed, two arguments unfold.
On the one hand, works by scholars such as Martha Nussbaum
demonstrate that many emotions have a cognitive structure:
they embody judgments about the objects to which they
respond that have a kind of logical structure. llS On the other
hand, psychologists such as Jonathan Haidt describe the
process of cognitive decisionmaking as embodying vital
affective components. 1l9 In one experiment, for example, people
who received a gift while shopping in a mall became happier,
and without being aware of it, evaluated their cars as
performing better than control subjects who had received no
·ft 120
gI.
This general appreciation of the cognitive dimensions of
emotion is particularly relevant to the empathetic emotions
that motivate gift-promising.
Emotion theories that
distinguish emotions as "basic" versus "non-basic" classifY
empathy as a non-basic emotion. 121 Comparing empathy with
emotions in law does not seem anomalous after all. See OATLEY ET AL., supra note 112,
at 21; Kahan & Nussbaum, supra note 113, at 277-78; MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM,
UPHEAVALS OF THOUGHT: THE INTELLIGENCE OF EMOTIONS 334 (2001). For a review of
the development of that argument in law-and-the-emotions scholarship, see Kathryn
Abrams & Hila Keren, ~o~ AlTaid of Law and the Emotions? 94 Minn. L. Rev.
(forthcoming 2010).
116 ANTONIO R. DAMASIO, DESCARTES' ERROR xv (1994).
117 Id.
118 See, e.g., MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, UPHEAVALS OF THOUGHT: THE INTELLIGENCE
OF EMOTIONS 334 (2001); ANDREW ORTONY ET AL., THE COGNITIVE STRUCTURE OF
EMOTIONS (reprint 1990) (1988); Richard Lazarus, Universal Antecedents of the
Emotions, in THE NATURE OF EMOTION 163-64 (Paul Ekman & Richard J. Davidson
eds., 1994) (arguing that emotions consist of "motivational, cognitive, and coping
activities that orient . . . creatures selectively to relevant features of their
environments").
119 Jonathan Haidt,
The Emotional Dog and Its Rational Tail: A Social
Intuitionist Approach to Moral Judgment, 108(4) PSYCHOL. REV. 814, (2001)
(explaining how cognition works on two tracks, one that functions instantaneously and
intuitively, and another that proceeds through conscious, temporally sustained, logical
operations).
120 The experiment was made by Alice Isen and colleagues. OATLEY ET AL., supra
note 112, at 24. Remarkably, the positive emotion induced by the gift regularly
increased the subjects' inclination to sympathize or provide help, a point that will be
further discussed here. See infra Part I1.E (discussing gratitude and reciprocity).
121 LAUREN WISPE, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF SYMPATHY 89-92, 161,177 (1991). For a
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archetypal "basic" emotions such as fear or anger, such theories
describe empathy as more cognitive, more conscious, and less
intense than those emotions. 122 To feel empathy or sympathy in
a manner developed enough to motivate an altruistic response,
one must have experienced substantial, sophisticated cognition.
Hoffman's five modes of empathic arousal (mentioned
earlier) demonstrate the fashion in which cognition plays a role
in the development of empathy in children. According to his
studies, the first three modes which are preverbal and
involuntary are followed by two additional "higher-order
cognitive modes.,,123 His developmental scheme emphasizes
how the kind of empathy that can motivate helping behavior
requires cognitive processes that exist only in advanced stages
of development. 124 Observing the growth of a sense of a
separated self in young children, Hoffman describes several
phases of progress. He explains how children start with
experiencing the needs and distresses of others as if they were
their own; then they begin to realize the distress is not their
own but still try to help the others by doing what would soothe
them. 125 Only later in life, when children reach more cognitive
maturity, can they see beyond themselves and recognize the
separate condition of the others and the distinct ways to help
them. 126 In those higher phases of development children need
to draw, not only on their affective response, but also on verbal
information regarding the other, their knowledge about the
other's life condition, and general information they have
acquired about the world. 127 The complex cognitive process that
discussion of basic (or primary) emotions, see, e.g., ROBERT PLUTCIDK, THE
PSYCHOLOGY AND BIOLOGY OF EMOTION 53-64 (1994); RICHARD LAzARus, EMOTIONS
AND ADAPTATION 79-82 (1991). For a critical view of such classification of the emotions,
see, e.g., Paul Ekman, All Emotions Are Basic, in THE NATURE OF EMOTION 15-19 (Paul
Ekman & Richard J. Davidson eds., 1994).
122 See, e.g., Nancy Eisenberg & Richard A. Fabes, Empathy; Conceptualization,
Measurement and Relation to Prosodal Behavior, 14 MOTIVATION AND EMOTION 131,
144 (1990) (arguing that "caring, compassion, sympathy and pity are seen as somewhat
lower in intensity").
123 MARTIN L. HOFFMAN, EMPATHY AND MORAL DEVELOPMENT: IMPLICATIONS FOR
CARING AND JUSTICE 5 (2000); see also WISPE, supra note 121, at 132-33 (discussing
the relationship of affect and cognition in sympathy).
124 HOFFMAN, supra note 124, at 6.
125 Id. at 63-71 (describing the first few stages of development, which do not allow
(yet) for an other-focused empathetic act).
126 Id. at 71-80.
127 Id. at 80-92.
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is required in those more advanced stages is a precondition for
fully developed acts of empathy to benefit another.128
In her seminal book, Upheavals of Thought, Martha
Nussbaum reviews and analyzes the cognitive requirements for
having the empathic emotions (which she terms
"compassion,,).129 Her approach offers philosophical grounding
to Hoffman's developmental argument. Drawing on Aristotle,
who originally defined the cognitive requirements for an
empathic motivation, she explains that this emotion has three
cognitive elements:
the judgment of size (a serious bad event has befallen
someone); the judgment of nondesert (this person did not
bring the suffering on himself or herself); and the
eudaimonistic judgment (this person, or creature, is a
significant element in my scheme of goals and projects, an
end whose good is to be promoted).130

Nussbaum's approach, like Hoffman's, suggests that the
evolution of an empathic emotion involves cognitive reactions
that make it less a burst of feeling than· a gradual, controlled,
sustained, logical process. With respect to Nussbaum's second
cognitive dimension, for example, the empathic person is
engaged in an elaborate analysis of the question of fault in an
effort to make sure the potential beneficiary of his help is
indeed worthy of receiving it.
"Insofar as we do feel
compassion," explains Nussbaum, "it is either because we
believe the person to be without blame for her plight or
because, though there is an element of fault, we believe that
her suffering is out of proportion to the fault.,,131 The exercise is
almost a mathematic one and "[c]ompassion then addresses
itself to the non blameworthy increment.,,132
Convincing support for this calculating view can be found
in Candace Clark's sociological research on American
approaches to empathic feeling (which she terms

128

Id. at 7,90.

MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, UPHEAVALS OF THOUGHT:
EMOTIONS 334 (2001).
130 Id. at 321.
131 I d. at 311.
129

132

THE INTELLIGENCE OF

Id.
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"sympathy"). 133 Based on numerous qualitative interviews,
Clark describes "our sympathy logic" as one that includes a
culpability analysis. 134 "The sympathy a person feels," she
argues, "is contingent on where on the luck-responsibility
continuum he or she assigns the other's problem.,,135 For
example, her interviewees had almost no doubt that hurricane
victims deserve sympathy but were more ambivalent with
regard to the miseries of an alcoholic law student and even less
empathic when thinking about an employee who stole a
chicken from her boss. 136 Clark explains that in the evaluation
process people "must weigh responsibility against luck and
against severity"137 and she reports that "some ... respondents
who ultimately sympathized explained that the severity of the
problem outweighed the characters' culpability (e.g., 'She
probably shouldn't have talked to the guy in the bar, but no one
deserves to be beaten.').,,138 Overall, Clark's findings correlate
with Hoffman's and Nussbaum's views and indicate a complex
assessment process in which cognition is an indispensable part
of the development of an empathic emotion.
The strong cognitive dimensions of empathic emotion
elaborated above call for reconsideration of the assumption
that donative promises are made impulsively. Moreover, the
investigation of empathy suggests an even stronger challenge
to the classic impulsive explanation of the unenforceability
Perhaps counter-intuitively, research shows that
rule.
impulsiveness is more related to refraining from altruistic
behavior than to engaging in it. Having uncontrolled feelings
of empathy due to empathic over-arousal (or under-regulation)
may cause a shift of attention from the other, whose condition
had triggered the emotion, to the empathetic self who feels
severe distress. That shift, in turn, may lead to a selfinterested motivation for detachment aimed at relieving the
anxiety by ignoring rather than by acknowledging the other's
condition. It is true that, at least according to Batson, some
altruism is motivated by an effort to relieve the distress by
ending the suffering of the other. However, Batson himself, as
133

CANDACE CLARK, MISERY AND COMPANY: SYMPATHY IN EVERYDAY LIFE (1997).

Id. at
Id. at
136 Id. at
137 Id. at
138
Id.
134
135
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well as others, has also argued that when possible a more
common response would be to escape the situation altogether,
i.e., not to respond to the other's needs. Interestingly, and
significantly to the current context, researchers have found
that it is the ability not to be impulsive that underlies acts of
giving, while the impulsive response may direct people to avoid
the other rather than to relate to her problems. Indeed,
"people who are skilled at regulating their emotion and
behavior are not only more likely to feel concern for [others],
but also are relatively likely to help others.,,139
Finally, even beyond this general cognitive profile of
empathy, the promises to give gifts that have occupied courts
seem especially distant from impulsive response. First, as
promises that anticipate the act of giving (while postponing the
actual giving behavior), they are imaginative acts that require
futuristic planning and elaborated thought. Second, being
verbally articulated and often written or even legally framed by
professionals, such promises involve cognitive processes beyond
the level required for developing empathy. And third, at least
in the case of written promises, the length of time and the level
of awareness that are necessary for the completion of the task
offer little justification for seeing the promise as impulsive.

D.

EMPATHY IS REWARDING

Part of the suspicion directed toward donative promises is
based on the belief that they are promises to give "something
for nothing,,140 and as such fail to provide any logic for the
desire to give. And yet, at least outside the law, scholars
increasingly understand that the notion that givers get
"nothing" in return is nothing but a myth. What are the
rewards attached to feeling and expressing empathy?

139 Nancy Eisenberg, Claire Hofer & Julie Vaughan, EffortfUl Control and Its
Socioemotional Consequences, in HANDBOOK OF EMOTION REGULATION 287, 299 (James
Gross ed., 2007).
140 Ballantine, supra note 84, at 121.
Ballantine wrote: "From a nude pact no
obligation arises. The courts have not felt impelled to extend a remedy to one who
seeks to get something for nothing. English law accordingly will not usually enforce a
promise unless it is given for value, or the promise of value."
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Egoistically Motivated Rewards

An obvious case of benefit is where the reward for the
promised gift is tangible. A giver also may promise to donate
with an expectation, not necessarily phrased as a precondition,
that her gift will become known to the world and will thereby
increase her reputation. The world of charitable subscriptions,
for example, is full of donors' names on walls, on chairs, in
programs, on banners - all of which celebrate, and publicize,
virtues of the donors. Publicizing a donation sends out a clear
double message: first, that the donor is capable of giving; and
second, that the donor is moral, generous and honorable. A
similar mechanism is at work when the gift is promised to
accomplish the promisor's goal of establishing or strengthening
a relationship with the promisee. 141 The reward in those cases
cannot be clearer.
Batson's empathy-altruism hypothesis underscores such
obvious rewards and points to two additional forms of return.
One may promise to give in order to satisfy a social norm, in an
effort to avoid the social cost of nonconformity. For example,
parents or grandparents may promise to fund their offspring's
college tuition out of an anxiety that refusing to pay for higher
education will negatively mark them in their community.
Avoiding this social cost may be experienced as the reward. A
similar logic is present in the second path described by Batson:
one may promise to give in order to relieve the distress caused
by empathic arousal in response to the needs (or even misery)
of others.
The three rewards discussed so far - from seeking more
reputation, through attempting to satisfy a social norm, to
looking for a sense of relief - are all egoistically motivated,142
141 See, e.g., Eric A. Posner, Altruism, Status, and Trust in the Law ofGifls and
Gratuitous Promises, 1997 WIS. L. REV. 567, 603-06 (1997) (observing that many
promises are made to initiate or further trust-based relationships). The case of Levine
v. Estate of Barton is a possible example, as Mr. Barton's promise to his beloved Ms.
Levine reads as aimed to help her but also suggests that Mr. Barton was interested in
having her closer to him after a period of long-distance relationship. Levine v. Estate
of Barton (In re Barton), No. W2004-02913-COA-R3-CV, 2005 Tenn. App. LEXIS 825
(Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 28, 2005).
142 These three rewards are nevertheless different in their connection to empathy.
While observable rewards have nothing to do with feeling empathy, the reward coming
from the saving of social costs is a case of responding to the social scripting of empathy
and pretending to feel it without having enough of the actual sentiment. The effort to
relieve self-distress reflects a problem of managing empathy that is actually felt but is
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in that the satisfaction of the needs of the giver - and not the
needs of the recipient - is the main source of the reward. This
is obvious if the reward is evident, as in the case of making a
gift public, but even in the more implicit cases, the promisor is
aiming at satisfying her own self-interest and the benefit
conferred on the promisee is merely a side effect. It can also be
said that the recipient's well-being is being used as a means to
benefit the donor: in agreeing to receive the gift, the promisee
enables the giver to receive something in exchange, be it
increased reputation, social conformity or emotional relief.
Overall, these three situations do not fit the formula of
"something for nothing," and in fact have a better correlation
with the conventional "quid pro quo" formula.

2.

Beyond Egoistic Rewards

Even when feeling empathy motivates a truly altruistic
form of behavior (Batson's hypothesis) there may still be
rewards to the giver, often quite significant. Those rewards are
of two main kinds: independent rewards that spring
irrespective of reciprocity, and rewards that are "paid back" by
the recipient. The reciprocal rewards will be discussed below;143
here the focus will be on the reward that comes from the
pleasure of giving. This autonomous and independent reward
is sometimes captured by the maxim "giving is receiving"; it
suggests that an important form of reward inheres in the act of
giving itself.
The pleasure of giving is familiar to anyone who has ever
given a present. It simply feels good. The good feeling usually
extends beyond the moment of giving: it begins with
contemplating the giving, progresses to the preparation of the
gift, and reaches a zenith when the actual giving is taking
place, especially if the gift is well received. The pleasure may
not well-regulated.
On scripting emotions, see Cheshire Calhoun, Making Up
Emotional People: The Case of Romantic Love, in THE PASSIONS OF LAw 217 (Susan
Bandes ed., 1999). A vivid description of the altruist script can be found in a New York
Times article: "We preach altruism to our children and occasionally even practice it
ourselves. Viewers of 'American Idol' were not surprised to see even Simon Cowell
sounding like Albert Schweitzer when he visited sick children in Africa; we expect at
least a show of altruism from everyone." John Tierney, Taxes a Pleasure? Check the
Brain Scan, N.Y. TIMES, June 19, 2007 (emphasis added) (reporting an Oregon
University experiment discussed in the text accompanying note 15049 infra).
143 See infra Part II.E.
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also last long after the giving moment (or fade and then
reappear), warming the heart of the giver when pleasant
memories surface. The warmth associated with giving has
been described as coming from within and therefore as
different from the externally derived rewards discussed earlier.
Researchers report that the altruistic behavior is accompanied
by "feelings of self-satisfaction and . . . a rise in . . . selfesteem."144 Some works have used the term "warm glow" - "the
joy of giving" - in reference to such internal rewards. 145
In the Levine v. Estate ofBarton case, the promise of Mr.
Barton to his lover included a direct reference to the pleasure
of giving. 146 His note to Ms. Levine said:
If your desire is to move back to Memphis or any other part
of the country, please do not hesitate because of financial
concerns. Knowing this would be extremely hard for you to
do, it would give me a great deal ofpleasure to know I helped
.
11
147
III some sma way.

Recent works in the field of neuroscience provide
confirming evidence of the pleasure that arises from giving.
Reporting on research by Professors Rilling and Berns,

144 Daniel Bar-Tal, R. Shaharabany &
A. Raviv, Cognitive Basis for the
Development of Altruistic Behavior, in COOPERATION AND HELPING BEHAVIOR:
THEORIES AND RESEARCH 387 (Derlega & Grzelak eds., 1982).
145 Adam Smith recognized the "warm glow" effect long ago, noting that "[wle are
pleased to think that we have rendered ourselves the natural objects of approbation, ..
. and we are mortified to reflect that we have justly merited the blame of those we live
with ...." ADAM SMITH, THE THEORY OF MORAL SENTIMENTS 117 (Grin Verlag 2009)
(1759). However, the term "warm glow" is sometimes used as including a mixture of
external and internal rewards. See, e.g., Robert A. Prentice, "Law &" Gratuitous
Promises, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 881, 885 (2007) (arguing that "warm glow may come
from helping others, from being public spirited, or from following the rules of society or
of morality"); James Andreoni, Impure Altruism and Donations to Public Goods: A
Theory of Warm-Glow Giving, 100 ECON. J. 464, 464 (1990). As a result of this broad
definition of the warm glow, it is sometimes interpreted as a selfish motivation for an
altruistic behavior. For example, the first path of Batson's model seems to include, as
equally egoistic, both the reward of gaining social approval (external reward) and the
reward of seeing oneself as a good person (internal reward). C. DANIEL BATSON, THE
ALTRUISM QUESTION: TOWARD A SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGICAL ANSWER 77 (1991). At points
Batson appears to be even more extreme in arguing that even the anticipation of
internal rewards without additional external rewards can render an act egoistic rather
than altruistic.
146 Levine v. Estate of Barton (In re Barton), No. W2004-02913-COA-R3-CV, 2005
Tenn. App. LEXIS 825 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 28, 2005).
147 Id. at *2 (emphasis added).
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Professor Keltner has concluded that "[h]elping others
triggered activity in the caudate nucleus and anterior
cingulate, portions of the brain that turn on when people
receive rewards or experience pleasure.,,148 . In a more-recent
experiment, students at the University of Oregon got $100 and
were asked to make decisions about whether to give money to a
local food bank. 149 They were also asked to respond to
mandatory, tax-like transfers of their money to the same food
bank. Throughout the process the students' brain activity was
measured by using functional magnetic resonance imaging
(fMRI).

Earlier studies had shown that activity in certain areas of
the brain (ventral striatum and the insulae) is correlated with
the pleasure of getting rewards. Those studies have shown
similar brain activity - located in the reward-processing areas
in the mid-brain - in response to monetary rewards (receiving
money) and the personal satisfaction derived from donating to
charities. 150 The Oregon study confirmed those findings, which
strongly support the notion that humans are "hard-wired to be
altruistic.,,151 In addition to these important findings, the
Oregon study added other interesting results. It demonstrated
that, even if the giving is mandatory rather than voluntary,
givers still experience a sentiment of pleasure from helping a
good cause. Importantly, subjects who gained some degree of
pleasure were later more willing to donate - voluntarily - to
.48 Dacher Keltner,
The Compassionate Instinct, in THE COMPASSIONATE
INSTINCT: THE SCIENCE OF HUMAN GoODNESS 8, 10 (Dacher Keltner, Jeremy Adam
Smith, & Jason Marsh eds., 2010); see also Ernst Fehr et aI., Neuroeconomic
Foundations of Trust and Social Preferences: Initial Evidence, 95(2) AM. ECON. REV.
346 (2005) (reporting neurological evidence that reciprocated acts of cooperation
generate pleasure). See generally THE SOCIAL NEUROSCIENCE OF EMPATHY (Jean
Decety & William Ickes eds., 2009).
1<9 William T. Harbaugh, Ulrich Mayr & Daniel Burghart, Neural Responses to
Taxation and Voluntary Giving Reveal Motives for Charitable Donations, SCIENCE,
June 15,2007.
'60 Id. at 1622 (reporting that "other studies have shown that activity in the
ventral striatum and the insulae is correlated with more abstract rewards, including ..
. voluntary contributions to charities" and referring to the following studies: (1) J. Moll
et al., Human Fronto-Mesoh"mbic Networks Guide Decisions About Charitable
Donation, PROC. NAT'L ACAD. SCI. U.S., Oct. 17, 2006, at 15623; and (2) D. Tankersley,
C. J. Stowe & S.A. Huettel, Altruism Is Associated with an Increased Neural Response
to Agency, 10 NAT. NEUROSCI. 150-51 (2007).
••• See Nicholas D. Kristof, Our Basic Human Pleasures: Food, Sex and Giving,
N.Y.
TIMES,
Jan.
16,
2010,
available
at
http://www.nytimes.coml20 10/0 1I17/opinionll7kristof.html.
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the food bank. This part of the Oregon study suggests that
altruistic giving is indeed motivated by the anticipation of
pleasure.
It also may suggest a form of rational
decisionmaking: indeed, the Oregon experiment was later
described as demonstrating that "the neural basis of charitable
giving decisions is consistent with a rational choice model
where people make their giving decisions by comparing the
utility they get from spending money on themselves with the
utility they get from seeing the charity have more resources to
devote to the public good.,,152 As psychologist Ulrich Mayr has
said:
The most surpnsmg result is that these basic pleasure
centers in the brain don't respond only to what's good for
yourself. They also seem to be tracking what's good for other
people, and this occurs even when the subjects don't have a
. whth
say m
a appens. 153

Beyond the evidence coming from the brain, there is
growing evidence that empathy-induced altruism can
contribute to the altruists' psychological and even physical
health. One survey of over 1,700 women involved regularly in
helping others, for example, has shown that these women
reported "feeling a 'high' while helping - a sense of stimulation,
warmth, and increased energy - and a 'calm' afterward - a
sense of relaxation, freedom from stress, and enhanced selfworth.,,154 Other studies further suggested that empathyinduced altruism may bring physical changes in heart rate and
blood pressure and, according to one researcher, may even
reduce the risk of heart disease. All in all, then, it is not
surprising that researchers of different disciplines have
152 Ulrich Mayr, William T. Harbaugh, & Dharol Tankersley, Neuroeconomics of
Charitable Giving and Philanthropy, in NEUROECONOMICS: DECISION MAKING AND THE
BRAIN 303, 311 (Paul W. Glimcher, Colin Camerer, Russell Ernst Fehr & Alan Poldrack
eds., 2008). I thank Professsor Mayr for his generous assistance with regard to the
challenging experience of engaging in interdisciplinary work and knowledge for nonlegal complex disciplines. This difficulty is inherent to working with the law-and-theemotions perspective. It is especially severe while doing the (second dimension) work
of "investigation," i.e., the effort to gain much non-legal knowledge about the relevant
emotion/so
153 John Tierney, Taxes a Pleasure? Check the Brain Scan, N.Y. TIMES, June 19,
2007.
154 C.
DANIEL BATSON, THE ALTRIDSM QUESTION: TOWARD A SOCIAL
PSYCHOLOGICAL ANSWER 222 (1991).
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developed a growing belief that doing good for others may do
good for the altruist. 155

3.

"The Hedonistic Paradox"

The recent evidence that the very act of giving produces
pleasure may revive what is sometimes called "the hedonistic
paradox":156 the idea that a psychic or affective "reward"
experienced by the giver renders the act of giving an egoistic
one. In one sense, the question of whether the rewards gained
by expressing empathy disqualify the behavior from being
purely altruistic is not relevant to the legal-enforcement
debate. Indeed, the presence of reward could make it easier to
argue that promises of gifts are simply supported by
consideration (i.e., the promisor's pleasure) and therefore are
eligible for enforcement.
On the other hand, seeing the pleasure as comparable to
monetary consideration may reinforce Eisenberg's argument
that the "world of gift" may be threatened by the application of
bargaining-like discourse. To deal with such concern it is
important to separate the rewarding pleasure from the core
motivation for acting. Although the pleasure of giving creates
brain activity akin to that produced by the gain of monetary
rewards, it does not follow that gifts lose their noble traits.
Despite the pleasure it produces, the gift may still be motivated
Id. at 222-23.
156 SERGE-CHRISTOPHE KOLM & JEAN MERCIER YTIDER, THE HANDBOOK OF THE
ECONOMICS OF GIVING, ALTRUISM AND RECIPROCITY: FOUNDATIONS 134-35 (2006)
(discussing the "so called hedonistic paradox" as follows: "if a person is motivated to
increase another's welfare, he is pleased to attain this desired goal and therefore his
apparent altruism can also be seen as a product of egoism."); C. Daniel Batson,
Altruism and Pro-Social Behavior, in THE HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 282-316
(Gilbert ed., 1998); see also C. Daniel Batson, Empathy-Induced Altruistic Motivation
at
(2008),
available
http://portal.idc.ac.il/eniSymposium/HerzliyaSymposium/DocumentsldcBatson.pdf
(explaining the paradox: "The argument goes as follows: Even if it were possible for a
person to have another's welfare as an ultimate goal, such a person would be interested
in attaining this goal and would experience pleasure on doing so; therefore, even this
apparent altruism would actually be a product of egoism."). A more popular expression
of the paradox was reported recently by the New York Times when Brian Mullaney, cofounder of Smile Train, which helps tens of thousands of children each year who are
born with cleft lips and cleft palates, was quoted saying: "The most selfish thing you
can do is to help other people." See Nicholas D. Kristof, Our Basic Human Pleasures:
Food, Sex and Giving, N.Y. TIMES, Jan 16, 2010, available at
http://www.nytimes.coml2010/0 1I17/0pinionil7kristof.html.
155
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by a non-selfish goal that is triggered by feelings of empathy; in
that way the special spirit of the gift does not have to be
submerged by the logic ofbargains. '57
The hedonistic paradox is therefore resolvable when we go
beyond the benefit of the promisor, to take account of her
intentions and human will. To avoid losing the spirit of the
gift, as an act that reflects human care, the question should not
simply be "was there a benefit to the promisor?" but also "in
what way did the promisor gain such benefit?" If a promisor
was mainly focused on her own interests, such as earning social
respect, then the act is not altruistic and we have enough
"regular" consideration to enforce the promise. On the other
hand, if the promisor was focused on making another person
better, then her pleasure from accomplishing that goal should
not interrupt the moral and personal value of her giving.
Recognizing the pleasure inherent in gIvrng, without
surrendering to the hedonic paradox, makes other-oriented
promising an activity that bears important similarities to
material exchanges yet is not detached from its altruistic roots.
E.

GRATITUDE AND "AFFECTIVE CONSIDERATION"

The pleasure of the giving promisor may not be enough to
justify enforceability, as it shows a benefit that is not
necessarily connected to dynamics of exchange. The traditional
bargaining theory leads to the exclusion of donative promises
because it perceives the process as a one-sided, voluntary flow
of benefits that occurs without reference to the recipient's
response. 158
Careful attention to the emotions involved,
however, can tell a different and more reciprocal story.
157 An interesting explanation for the inclination to see a conflict between gifts
and pleasure can be seen in the puritan Christian tradition that expects people to give
selflessly. However, many believe today that it is inaccurate to conclude that helping
another and feeling good about oneself are incompatible. See C. R. SNYDER & SHANE J.
LoPEZ, POSITIVE PSYCHOLOGY: THE SCIENTIFIC AND PRACTICAL EXPLORATIONS OF
HUMAN STRENGTHS 270 (2006); COLIN GRANT, ALTRUISM AND CHRISTIAN ETHICS 77-79
(2000).
158 Jane B. Baron, Gifts, Bargains and Form, 64 IND. L.J. 155, 156 (1989) (arguing
as follows: "[G)ifts are treated as one-sided transfers which merely redistribute existing
wealth, and they thus are not thought to warrant legal enforcement unless their
formality renders administration of them simple. Bargains, on the other hand, are
considered two-sided exchanges which create wealth, and due to their substantive
importance they are thought to warrant enforcement without formality.") (emphasis
added).
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The emotions that motivate the promising of gifts are
seldom unreciprocated. And yet this reciprocity does not mean
"bargaining" but rather is an affective reciprocity.
An
expression of empathy and compassion - as in the case of
promising a gift - elicits many emotions in the recipient, most
notably a strong sentiment of gratitude. The word gratitude
comes from gratia (favor) and gratus (pleasure) in Latin; its
roots connect it to ideas of "kindness, generousness, gifts, the
beauty of giving and receiving, or getting something for
nothing.,,159 The engagement with gratuitous promises has
therefore tight linguistic ties with the dynamics of gratitude.
Accordingly, any investigation of these promises can benefit
from learning more about the way gratitude operates.
As an emotion, gratitude had until recently been
understudied and almost neglected, a fact that is often
explained by the difference between gratitude and some
accepted basic emotions such as fear, anger or even
happiness. 160 Hume, for example, defined gratitude as a "calm
passion," as it seldom bursts or gushes, as do the more ''basic''
Recent studies of gratitude have classified
emotions. 161
gratitude as a higher-level moral emotion that involves both
social and cognitive processes. 162 Moreover, some emotion
theorists have connected each emotion with a distinct
"dramatic plot" or "core relational theme.,,163 In such theories
the "plot" of gratitude is highly reciprocal: it is triggered when
one person gives something that promotes the well-being of
another, who in return becomes grateful and is motivated to
express her gratitude, whether in words or by another act of
giving. When gratitude produces counter-gifting, the work of
the renowned anthropologist Marcel Mauss, whose words
159 Robert A. Emmons, The Psychology of Gratitude: An Introduction, in THE
PSYCHOLOGY OF GRATITUDE 4 (Robert A. Emmons & Michael E. McCullough eds.,
2004) (quoting P. W. PRUYSER, THE MINISTER AS DIAGNOSTICIAN 69 (1976».
160 Robert C. Solomon, Foreword, in THE PSYCHOLOGY OF GRATITUDE at v-vi;
Emmons, in THE PSYCHOLOGY OF GRATITUDE at 3-4.
161 Robert C. Solomon, Foreword, in THE PSYCHOLOGY OF GRATITUDE at vi.
162 Ross Buck, The Gratitude of Exchange and the Gratitude of Caring: A
Developmental-Interactionist Perspective of Moral Emotion, in THE PSYCHOLOGY OF
GRATITUDE at 10l.
163 Michael E. McCullough & Jo-Ann Tsang, Parent of the Virtues? The Prosocial
Contours of Gratitude, in THE PSYCHOLOGY OF GRATITUDE at 124 (explaining the
theory and referring to R. S. LAzARUS & B. N. LAzARUS, PASSION AND REASON: MAKING
SENSE OF OUR EMOTIONS (1994».
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opened this Article, comes to mind. 164 Mauss suggested that
the whole idea of a free gift is based on a misunderstanding,
and in fact many societies can be described as based on a
system of reciprocal gift-exchange. 165
Such a system is
comparable to the now more acknowledged system of marketexchange and, remarkably, Mauss has even argued that gift
exchanges are "the archaic forms ofcontract."166
While direct application of Mauss's exchange arguments
can offer support to the idea of enforcing donative promises,167
it also triggers the fear of too commercialized a view of gifts, a
fear which has been used as an argument against
enforcement. 16B Paying special attention to the reciprocity of
the emotions that motivate gifting behavior, rather than to the
reciprocity of the behavior itself, may be valuable in coping
with this concern. It associates such promises with reciprocity,
without undermining their distinctive non-market character.
For this reason, it is important to note that gratitude is not
simply an automatic response to receiving a benefit from
another; the dynamics of exchange here depend on the
existence of specific affective features, mainly the right
intentions. Adam Smith may have been the first to argue that,
in order to feel and express gratitude, people must believe that
their benefactors intended to benefit them. 169 This approach
tightly connects gratitude with empathy and creates "an
economy of gratitude," where gratitude is taken as a known
and expected response to an expression of empathy.
The last idea is especially relevant to the unenforceability
164 For a thorough discussion of the principal of reciprocity and Mauss's work, see
Serge-Christophe Kolm, Reciprocity: Its Scope, Rationales, and Consequences, in
HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF GIVING, RECIPROCITY AND ALTRUISM FOUNDATIONS
VOLUME 1, 371 (Serge-Christophe Kolm & Jean Mercier Ythier eds., 2006), available at
http://www.sciencedirect.com.
165 Mary Douglas, Foreword: No Free Gifts, in MARCEL MAUSS, THE GIFT: THE
FORM AND REASON FOR EXCHANGE IN ARCHAIC SOCIETIES xii to xviii (W.D. Halls trans.,
W. W. Norton & Co. 2000) (1950).
166 MAuSS, supra note 2, at 5.
167 Jane B. Baron, Gifts, Bargains and Form, 64 IND. L.J. 155, 194-95 (1989)
(relying on Mauss's exchange analysis to justify the enforcement of gratuitous
promises).
168 Eisenberg, supra note 6, at 841-44 (responding to Baron's reliance on Mauss's
arguments).
169 Michael E. McCullough & Jo-Ann Tsang, Parent of the Virtues? The Prosocial
Contours of Gratitude, in THE PSYCHOLOGY OF GRATITUDE 124 (Robert A. Emmons &
Michael E. McCullough eds., 2004).
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discussion since contractual promises to give gifts are by
nature a result of an intended effort, evidenced by the fact that
the promisor has articulated and sometimes has written a clear
promise to benefit the promisee. Consequently, those promises
can be understood, as Smith suggests, as part of the economy of
gratitude in which the donative promise, as an empathic act of
the promisor, is reciprocated by the promisee's feelings of
gratitude. Furthermore, under the same "economic" logic,
gratitude is not only a typical response to empathy, but a
reaction which is expected by society. And yet, despite the use
of a "cost-benefit" logic, the economy of gratitude is different
from the economy of goods ("a bargain"), as it is based on good
will and social care rather than on utility analysis. Therefore,
in recognizing the affective reciprocity that is elicited by
donative promises, it is possible to see their parallel to
bargained-for promises without damaging the uniqueness of
the affective domain. 170
Furthermore, the plot of gratitude tends to perpetuate
empathic affects which in turn motivate more gifting behavior
and additional gratitude, creating a cycle of empathy and
gratitude. Such circularity lends gratitude both its individual
value and its pro-social importance and, as we shall see, it
offers a new normative reason for the enforcement of donative
•
171
promIses.
However, notwithstanding their harmonious value, the
cycles of empathy and gratitude also expose the fact that, as
with bargained-for promises, donative promises may also entail
a burden on the promisee. Even though the burden is not
material, but rather affective, it still may be seen as
detrimental for the recipient.
Indeed, socio-psychological
studies show that some people associate gratitude with
dependency and even some degree of humiliation, as the
emotion suggests they cannot be totally autonomous and selfsufficient. Interestingly, those studies also show that such a

170 See Baron, supra note 167, at 194 (maintaining that "[flor non-lawyers gifts
are exchanges").
171 See infra Part III (arguing that to individuals gratitude contributes mental
and physical progress that in turn allows grateful people to give even more and by that
to invite more empathy, and discussing the social value of the empathy-gratitude
"chain of reciprocity"); see also Aafke Elisabeth Komter, Gratitude and Gift Exchange,
in THE PSYCHOLOGY OF GRATITUDE 195 (Robert A. Emmons & Michael E. McCullough
eds., 2004).
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view of gratitude is culturally contingent. Apparently, the level
of tendency to admit, express, or even to discuss gratitude
varies from one culture to another and is especially low in
cultures where capitalistic and individualistic ideas prevail.
For example, studies have found that, when compared to other
societies, Americans and especially American men reported
much more discomfort with regard to feeling and showing
gratitude and tended to view the experience of gratitude as
unpleasant and even humiliating. 172 As Robert Solomon
explained: "Gratitude presupposes so many judgments about
debt and dependency that it is easy to see why supposedly selfreliant American males would feel queasy about even
discussing it.,,173 This uneasiness with gratitude was nicely
captured in a scene from The Simpsons, in which Bart Simpson
refuses to say grace at the family dinner table and instead
sends out a self-reliant message, saying, "Dear God, we paid for
all this stuff ourselves, so thanks for nothing.,,174
The view of gratitude as a possible burden inflicted on the
recipient by the giver's expression of empathy is not new and
can be traced back to Aristotle. 175 Later, in the nineteenth
century, Ralph Waldo Emerson made a similar point with
regard to law and gifts, emphasizing the cost of gratitude by
saying, "The law of benefits is a difficult channel. ... It is not
the office of a man to receive gifts. How dare you give them?
We wish to be self-sustained."176 Emerson's words suggest that
172 See s. Sommers & c. Kosmitzki, Emotion and Social Context: An AmericanGerman Comparison, 27(1) BRIT. J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 35-49 (1988) (comparing Americans
to Germans and Israelis). There is also some empirical evidence that gratitude is
associated with feminine gender-role stereotypic traits. In the above study, for
example, not even one woman said that it was difficult for her to openly express
gratitude. See also Leslie R. Brody, On Understanding Gender DiJrerences in the
Expression ofEmotion, in HUMAN FEELINGS: EXPLORATIONS IN AFFECT DEVELOPMENT
AND MEANING 87 (S. Ablon et al. eds., 1993).
173 Robert Solomon, The Cross Cultural Comparison of Emotion, in EMOTIONS IN
AsIAN THOUGHT: A DIALOGUE IN COMPARATIVE PHILOSOPHY 282 (J. Marks & R. Ames
eds., 1995).
174 ROBERT EMMONS, THANKS! How THE NEW SCIENCE OF GRATITUDE CAN MAKE
YOU HAPPIER 8 (2007).
175 Emmons, in THE PSYCHOLOGY OF GRATITUDE at 8 (discussing Aristotle's
reasoning for not including gratitude among the virtues. According to Aristotle,
magnanimous people "insist on their self-sufficiency and therefore find it demeaning to
be indebted and thus grateful to others").
176 EMMONS, supra note 174, at 130. The full text of Emerson's essay is available
at http://www.blupete.com/Literature/EssayslBesUEmersonGifts.htm (last visited Mar.
31,2010).

Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 2010

51

Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 40, Iss. 2 [2010], Art. 3

216

GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 40

gratuitous promises may be seen as creating affective
consideration not by producing affective benefit to the promisor
but by generating an "affective detriment" to the promisee.
Such detriment is grounded in the emotions, but it is
structurally similar to the detriment that normally satisfies the
consideration requirement and allows enforceability.
The fact that gratefulness does not enrich the promisor of a
donative promise or that feelings of gratitude are actually
positive and healthy does not necessarily conflict with finding a
detriment in making someone obliged to feel gratitude.
Revisiting the infamous case of Hamer v. Sidway can further
clarify the point.177 In this case an uncle promised a gift to his
nephew: $5,000 to be given to the nephew after he attained
age twenty-one, if he would refrain from smoking, drinking and
playing cards or billiards for money.178 The lower court found
no consideration and refused enforcement, classifying the
uncle's promise as gratuitous. 179 According to that court, the
uncle was not enriched by his nephew's good behavior, and as
far as the nephew was concerned such good behavior was
actually beneficial and not detrimental. 18o On appeal, however,
Judge Parker explained that it is much easier to satisfy the
consideration requirement, and detriment should be broadly
construed to include any restriction of a lawful freedom. 181
Since the nephew had the right to smoke, giving up smoking in
exchange for the promise of money was a detriment that
established
consideration
and
therefore
allowed
enforceability. 182 Applying the broad reading of "detriment" in
Hamer v. Sidwayto our discussion makes it possible to point to
an affective detriment when donative promises elicit counter
gratitude.
III. INTEGRATION: AFFECTIVE CONSIDERATION WITH INTENT
TO BE LEGALLY BOUND

In Part I we have seen that the classical doctrine has
Hamer v. Sidway, 27 N.E. 256 (N.Y. 1891).
Hamer v. Sidway, 11 N.Y.S. 182, 182-84 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1890), rev'd, 27 N.E.
256 (N.Y. 1891).
179 Id. at 185-86.
180 Id.
181 Hamer v. Sidway, 27 N.E. 256, 257 (N.Y. 1891).
182
Id.
177
178
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adopted an unenforceability rule for donative promises due to
their affective nature and as a way of reinforcing an association
between law and contracts on the one hand and rational
choices on the other. Part II then explored the primary
emotions that operate in gift situations and their interaction.
It will now be useful to return to law and to ask the normative
question: should the law of contracts enforce donative
promises? The coming analysis will review the leading
justifications for enforcing bargained-for promises and will
suggest that each of them is relevant to the enforcement of
donative promises, not in spite of their distinctiveness, but
precisely because oftheir affective dimensions.
A.

THE WILL THEORY AND THE POWER OF PROMISES

According to the will theory of contract, a promise merits
enforcement because of the expressed will of the promisor to be
bound by it. The theory focuses on such will as "something
inherently worthy of respect,"183 and it is informed and
influenced by Kantian philosophy.184 The theory stems from
the liberal notion that all human beings are autonomous moral
agents, obliged to keep those promises they freely undertake.
By legally compelling promisors to live up to their obligations,
therefore, society values their contractual agency. The freedom
to contract, meaning the basic ability of individuals to engage
themselves in contractual relationships and receive the support
of law through contractual enforcement, is therefore of utmost
importance under this approach. 18s Promises that are made
intentionally are central to will theories: the very act of
articulating a promise is taken as an extension of the human
will that triggered it as well as an expression of a free choice
that was made; both giving the promise the highest moral
status. To the individual value of enforcing promises, "will
theorists" add a social dimension. From their point of view,
keeping promises is the key to the ability of humans to trust
each other, which makes promises a vital foundation of a
healthy society and further justifies investing social resources
183

Morris Cohen, The Basis ofContract, 46 HARv. L. REV. 553, 575 (1933).

DORI KIMEL, FROM PROMISE TO CONTRACT: TOWARDS A LIBERAL THEORY OF
CONTRACT 9-11 (2003).
184

185 Hila Keren, "We Insist! Freedom Now"; Does Contract Doctrine Have
Anything Constitutional To Say! 11 MICH. J. RACE & L. 133, 172 (2005).
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in their enforcement. ls6
From this perspective, the free choice of a donor to express
her empathy and care for another via a promise to give a gift
should mean that she is no longer free to break that promise.
This is particularly true in the many cases in which promisors
have made palpable efforts to be legally bound by their
promises. Efforts such as writing down the promise, framing it
in legal language, and especially taking pains to try to
nominally satisfy the consideration requirement in order to win
enforceability (the "peppercorn" practice)IS7 all suggest
increasing degrees of a will to be legally bound and an
intention to create an enforceable promise.
The current regime of unenforceability of donative
promises has been linked to a view of those promises as
expressing a will that is "damaged" or "unreaL" This view
derives from the assumption that the gift situation reflects a
severely imbalanced exchange (the promisor being seen as
"giving something for nothing"), one that probably was not
rationally and freely chosen. Meaningfully, under a true
understanding of the will theory, no similar reservation exists
with regard to business promises. ISS The research into empathy
and altruistic behavior discussed above challenges the legal
assumption that there is something wrong with the will to give
gifts. The significant nonmonetary rewards that flow from
giving - such as the pleasure that is evidenced by specific brain
activity in the giver, or the gratitude of the recipient - frame
the choice to give as a natural and very common form of human
will, and leave no reason to suspect the intentions of generous
promisors.
Consequently, from the will-theory perspective, a refusal to
enforce donative promises severely limits people's freedom to

186

CHARLES FRIED, CONTRACT AS PROMISE:

A THEORY OF CONTRACTUAL

OBLIGATION 13 (1981).
187 Joseph Siprut, The Peppercorn Reconsidered:

My a Promise To Sell
Blackacre for Nominal Consideration Is Not Binding, but Should Be, 97 Nw. V.L. REV.
1809, 1810 (2003) (showing that "under existing law, promisors are powerless to make
a binding gratuitous promise no matter how strong the desire or how clear the
intention" and arguing for a reform).
188 See Eyal Zamir, The Missing Interest:
Restoration of the Contractual
Equivalence, 93 VA. L. REV. 59, 104 (2007). According to the will theory, the
contractual liability stems from the intrinsic moral force of the promise regardless of
its content, and the adequacy of the exchange (like many other utilitarian and
consequential matters) should not matter.
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contract, disrespects their autonomy, and in the long run
endangers the status of promises altogether. As argued by the
eminent American "will theorist" Professor Charles Fried, "If
we decline to take seriously [the obligatory power of the
promise] . .. to that extent we do not take [the promisor]
.
I y as a person. ,,189
serIous
B.

CONSEQUENTIALIST CONSIDERATIONS

Consequentialist views (including economic-efficiency
analysis) suggest that bargained-for promises deserve
enforcement because they advance the well-being of both
promisor and promisee, and therefore in the aggregate
contribute to society as a whole. A bargained-for promise is
considered to be socially "productive," or to be an efficient way
to achieve wealth-maximization. 190
From this perspective, the unenforceability rule of
donative promises may arise from the assumption that they are
- from a utilitarian point of view - "sterile," "nude," or nonproductive. The idea was bluntly expressed by Professor
Fuller, who wrote:
While an exchange of goods is a transaction which conduces
to the production of wealth and the division oflabor, a gift is
... a "sterile transmission."l9l

However, the economic focus on wealth-maximization is
only one way of evaluating the consequences of a certain rule.
Other, broader consequentialist theories are possible.
A
consequentialist moral theory requires the promotion of
favorable outcomes and entails a choice between different legal
rules according to the goodness of their resulting states of
affairs. But a consequentialist framework is not committed to
any particular theory of the good. It can encompass anything
that would improve individual or social outcomes including
"desires, ... beliefs, emotions, ... the climate, and everything

FRIED, supra note 186, at 20-2l.
This kind of analysis assumes the rationality of human beings and their
ability to engage in self-interested cost-benefit analysis to maximize their own wealth.
191 Lon L. Fuller, Consideration and Form, 41 COLUM. L. REV. 799,815 (1941); see
also ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS 52 (3d ed. 1998) (arguing that "[g]ifts are not
necessarily productive").
189

190
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else.,,192 For instance, one may claim that the appropriate
criterion of well-being is a favorable mental state, rather than
the maximization of wealth or the satisfaction of selfish
preferences. A famous example of such a possibility is Jeremy
Bentham's utilitarian conception of welfare, which equates
well-being with happiness. 193
Any consequentialist approach that is broader than the
efficiency theory associated with traditional forms of law and
economics would give significant weight to affectively related
outcomes of enforcing promises to give giftS. 194 Indeed, some
outcomes are desirable even from the narrow perspective of law
and economics, although they have not led to a normative call
for enforcement. Writing about the issue at hand, Richard
Posner, for example, explained that the value of a donative
promise to both the promisor and the promisee is higher under
an enforceability regime, where the keeping of the promise
enjoys higher probability.195 Similarly, Professor Eisenberg
admits that, counter to conventional belief, donative promises
have some redistributional outcomes that may enhance
'l'ty. 196
u t 11
Applying law-and-the-emotions perspective to the
consequentialist analysis can offer a greater awareness of those
outcomes that concern the atrective aspects of our well-being.
These outcomes arise from the individual and social value of
positive emotions in general, and particularly from the
emotions of empathy and gratitude, which dominate the gift
domain. In his famous lecture "Rational Fools," economist and
philosopher Amartya Sen argued that we cannot normatively
evaluate an act or a rule "without mentioning the sympathetic

DEREK PARFIT, REASONS AND PERSONS 25 (1984) (emphasis added).
JEREMY BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND
LEGISLATION 11-12 (J.H. Burns & H.L.A. Hart eds., Anthlone Press 1970) (1780).
194 See Prentice, supra note 7, at 881 (a recent broad approach coming from
within law and economics, namely from the emerging "behavioral law and economics").
195 Richard A. Posner, Gratuitous Promises in Economics and Law, 6 J. LEGAL
STUD. 411, 412 (1977) (arguing and explaining how making a donative promise has the
effect of "increasing the present value of an uncertain future stream of transfer
payments").
196 Eisenberg, supra note 6, at 828-29.
Eisenberg argues, however, that such
utilitarian value is offset by the possibility that enforcement will decrease the amount
of gifts. Id. For an illuminating analysis of the utilitarian value of redistributional
voluntary transfers, see Daphna Lewinsohn-Zamir, In Defense of Redistribution
Through Private Law, 91 MINN. L. REV. 326 (2006).
192
193
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concern people have for the good of others, as a factor
independent of their concern for their own satisfactions.,,197 A
law that supports and validates expressions of "sympathetic
concern" is, from this consequentialist perspective, a proper
law because it promotes the well-being of the promisor (the
giver). This promotion of well-being occurs when the law
respects the promisor's choice to have less money and more
satisfaction of her concern for others. The same logic of
enforcing a bargained-for promise is useful here too: the
voluntary promise to transfer wealth should be taken as
evidence of the promisor's set of preferences, where preferences
- according to utilitarian theories - should be followed because
they represent the best available way to enhance the welfare of
the promisor (and thus of society at large).
Under an inclusive definition of goodness, there are a place
and a need to take into account all the valuable influences of
feeling empathy and acting altruistically. As we have seen in
the previous Part, feeling and expressing empathy are highly
rewarding from the perspective of the promisor, who may
experience everything from pleasure to better health, better
self-image, more social respect and less anxiety. Indeed, such
an abundance of rewards creates incentives to engage in
empathy-induced altruism, and supporting such altruism by
legal enforcement facilitates more positive outcomes of the
same sort.
Beyond these individual gains, the relationship between
empathy and altruistic behavior (Batson's hypothesis) can also
enhance collective well-being. The pro-social acts that arise
from feeling and expressing empathy have an immense
potential for improving society at large. For this reason, for
example, scientists and psychologists have recently directed
growing efforts to the project of cultivating empathy in children
and adults. 198
We have discussed above the fact that empathy often
elicits gratitude in a self-reinforcing cycle. If we are concerned
about social outcomes, there is a clear benefit in offering legal
197 MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, UPHEAVALS OF THOUGHT:
THE INTELLIGENCE OF
EMOTIONS 391 (2001).
198 DACHER KELTNER, The Compassionate Instinct, in THE COMPASSIONATE
INSTINCT: THE SCIENCE OF HUMAN GOODNESS 14-15 (Dacher Keltner, Jeremy Adam
Smith, & Jason Marsh eds., 2010); C. DANIEL BATSON, THE ALTRUISM QUESTION:
TOWARD A SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGICAL ANSWER 224-29 (1991).
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support to a process of gift-promising that not only expresses
empathy but also fosters feelings of gratitude.
On the
individualistic level gratitude permits the grateful to
"experience a variety of measurable benefits: psychological,
physical and social," 199 sometimes to a point that it "can
measurably change people's lives.,,200 In addition, research
demonstrates that gratitude has an extremely beneficial social
role. In the words of one scholar, "its sociological importance
can hardly be overestimated" and without it society would
break apart. 201 Gratitude, which forms a critical link between
receiving and giving, moves recipients to share and increase
what they have received. It thereby serves as "a pivotal
concept for our social interactions."202 Grateful people engage
in more supportive, kind, and helpful behaviors (e.g., loaning
money and providing compassion, sympathy, and emotional
support) than do their less-grateful peers. 203 As individuals and
as a society, therefore, we enhance human well-being by
supporting gratitude.
Even more generally, empathy, as a positive emotion, is
directly connected to personal growth. Positive emotions,
argue contemporary psychologists and theorists of emotion,
"widen the array of thoughts and actions that come to mind"
(the broadening effect) and then develop people's enduring
personal resources (the building effect). 204 Therefore, under
almost any consequentialist approach, society gains by
nurturing the positive emotions in general and empathy in
particular.
As psychologist Barbara Fredrickson emphasized:
Positive emotions also produce flourishing. Moreover, they
do so not simply within the present, pleasant moment but
over the long term as well. The take-home message is that

199

Robert A. Emmons, Pay It Forward, THE GREATER GOOD, Summer 2007, at 12-

13.

Id. at 13.
Georg Simmel, Faithfulness and Gratitude, in Kurt H. Wolff, THE SOCIOLOGY
OF GEORG SIMMEL (Free Press, 1950), at 387.
202 Robert A. Emmons, Pay It Forward, in THE COMPASSIONATE INSTINCT: THE
SCIENCE OF HUMAN GoODNESS 77-85 (Dacher Keltner, Jeremy Adam Smith, & Jason
Marsh eds., 2010).
203 Emmons, supra note 199, at 14.
204 Barbara L. Fredrickson, Positive Emotions, in THE HANDBOOK OF POSITIVE
PSYCHOLOGY 120, 125 (C. R. Snyder & Shane J. Lopez eds., 2002).
200

201
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positive emotions are worth cultivating, not just as end
states in themselves but also as a means to achieving
205
psychological growth and improved well-being over time.

For consequentialists, then, the contribution of positive
emotions such as empathy to personal well-being and social
welfare should make an enforceability rule more appealing
than the current unenforceability.206
C.

FAIRNESS

The discussion above also points to a fairness concern that
supports enforceability. In the debate over the question of
donative promises, it is common to argue that the
unenforceability principle does not usually damage the
promisee and therefore enforceability is not justified. 207 If any
damage was caused, it is further argued, enforcement will
follow not from the mere breaking of the promise but from the
protection granted to promisees in cases of justified reliance.
As clarified in the well-known case of Ricketts v. Scothorn, for
example, promises that are relied upon by the donee to her
detriment will be enforced on that ground, even though
consideration is lacking, under the promissory-estoppel
doctrine. 208
Despite this ostensibly comforting consensus, the
knowledge about gratitude as an immediate and unavoidable
response to empathetic giving exposes a possible problem not
covered by the conventional protection of reliance.
The
problem arises from the immediate and unavoidable traits of
gratitude. Only a potential recipient who rejects the gift is
immune from feelings of gratitude, and indeed for the most
part a reluctance to experience gratitude - with all its
meanings - is the primary reason for rejecting a gift in the first
place. Conversely, recipients who have not rejected the gift will
205 Barbara L. Fredrickson, The Role of Positive Emotions in Positive Psychology,
56(3) AM. PSYCHOL. 218, (2001).
206 Chris Hann,
The Gift and Reciprocity:
Perspectives trom Economic
Anthropology, in HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF GIVING, RECIPROCITY AND
ALTRUISM FOUNDATIONS VOLUME 1, 207-23 (Serge-Christophe Kolm & Jean Mercier
Ythier eds., 2006).
201 Eisenberg, supra note 6, at 822; MARVIN A. CmRELSTEIN, CONCEPTS AND CASE
ANALYSIS IN THE LAW OF CONTRACT 20-21 (2006).
208 Ricketts v. Scothorn, 77 N.W. 365 (Neb. 1898).
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almost inevitably feel gratitude and often express it. In such
cases the promisee's sense of gratitude can be seen as an act of
special reliance. If later on the promise is broken, this
gratitude cannot be taken back, and it becomes an affective
cost suffered by the promisee. Admittedly, in the atypical case
in which the original promisor is the one who reneges, the
problem may be of modest scope, as the feelings of
disappointment or even anger of the promisee may balance the
gratitude earlier "given." And yet, in most cases it is not the
original promisor who experiences a change of mind. As
mentioned earlier, the common case is one in which the
promisor is no longer alive and the promise is broken by
relatives who are interested in the promised gift for
themselves. This situation creates an irreversible harm in the
promisee, as the fundamental affective exchange (empathy for
gratitude) has already happened: the original promisor took
with her the gratitude and all it may generate - from loyalty to
care and love - and the disappointed promisee is impoverished
without compensation for what may be seen as "affective
reliance."
In this situation, fairness concerns call for protecting the
grateful promisee. The law can best do this by acknowledging
the importance of gratitude, categorizing it either as an
affective detriment suffered by the promisee or as an affective
reliance on her part. Either way, enforceability seems a more
appropriate legal response.
D. THE RISK OF "COMMODIFICATION"

A final argument, framed by Professor Eisenberg, is that
enforcement would have the effect of "commodifying the gift
As Eisenberg210 and others211 have
relationship.,,209
acknowledged, this argument is at least rhetorically different
from other objections to enforcement. It attempts to deny legal
enforcement not because of the inferiority of gifts, but due to
their supposed superiority.
Eisenberg's "commodification" argument is actually made

Eisenberg, supra note 6, at 848.
Id. at 849.
211 Mark B. Wessman, Recent Defenses of Consideration: Commodification and
Collaboration, 41 IND. L. REV. 9 (2008).
209

210
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out of two arguments: the first is the presumption that legal
enforcement means commodification, and the second is the
contention that commodification is a negative process
(impoverishing). Both sub-arguments are tightly connected by
Eisenberg himself to the evaluation of a prospective encounter
between law and emotions - a moment about which Eisenberg
is fairly pessimistic. His approach therefore invites a response
that would be especially attentive to the interrelation of law
and the emotions in this context of gifts.
With regard to the presumption that enforcement means
commodification, it should be noted from the outset that
Eisenberg's is an uncommon use of the notion. At the very
minimum it requires more explanation than has so far been
offered: in what way does enforcing a promise transform the
promise into a commodity?
The term "commodification" is usually used to describe a
process of placing a price tag on something that did not have a
price before or that is not usually associated with commercial
trade. The concept is, of course, deeply connected to the idea of
the market, where things are being bought and sold, and to the
belief that some things "are not for sale.,,212
In the
commodification literature the concept of "contested
commodities" is reserved for a long list of "things" - such as
babies, women, body organs, sex, care, and so on - that
"challenge us to try to understand the appropriate scope of the
market.,,213 Conceptualizing such things as commodities creates
some degree of discomfort as "we experience personal and
social conflict about the process and the result.,,214
However, this common meaning of commodification is not
really relevant to the current enforceability debate, which
makes the use of the term "commodification" in this context
212 Martha Ertman & Joan Williams, Preface: Freedom, Equality and the Many
Futures of Commodification, in RETIllNKING COMMODIFICATION: CASES AND READINGS
IN LAw AND CULTURE 1 (Martha Ertman & Joan Williams eds., 2005).
213 Margaret
Jane
Radin,
Contested Commodities, in RETlflNKING
COMMODIFICATION: CASES AND READINGS IN LAw AND CULTURE 81 (Martha Ertman &
Joan Williams eds., 2005); see also Michele Goodwin, The Body Market: Race Politics &
Private Ordering, 49 ARIz. L. REV. 599 (2007), which argues that social justice can be
better achieved through regulated markets for organs, ova, and even hair. In the
absence of regulated markets, black markets and coercive, fraudulent secondary
regimes will develop (and have developed) alongside altruistic procurement strategies;
these are more oppressive than their regulated counterparts.
214 Radin, supra note 213, at 81.
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problematic. Most donative promises already come with a price
tag attached. Indeed, in most of the cases the litigation in
courts has involved donative promises to transfer particular
sums of money and/or assets that have a well-defined and notcontested market value. Moreover, with respect to many
contested commodities, the legal approach is to allow - and
even encourage - free and donative transfers precisely out of
anti-commodification motives. Supporting donations ("gifts") is
thus the main legal way of resisting commodificaton and
preventing recourse to the market. Primary examples can be
found in legal regulation of organ donations combined with
prohibition of their sale, as well as in allowing surrogacy
agreements but barring payment to the surrogate mothers.215
Donative promises are, by definition, different from
commercial exchange - they are not aimed at selling and
buying, and their entire separate existence depends on
recognizing that fact. 216 It is hard therefore to see what can be
the contested commodity or the subject of commodification in
the case of such promises.
The last point is not only semantic, as rhetoric can be
powerfully misleading. The use of the term "commodification"
in such an idiosyncratic manner is far from a neutral phrasing.
It has the power of educing strong anti-commodification
sentiments, normally reserved for the most challenging
dilemmas, such as the sale of babies, and directing them at
another context without any clear justification. The remainder
of this discussion will consequently refrain from using this
loaded term.
The risk ascribed by Eisenberg to legal enforcement is
more connected to a concern about applying legal norms to
215 See, e.g., Peter Halewood, On Commodification and Self-Ownership, 20 YALE
J.L. & HUMAN 131, 133 (2008) (citing Richard Titmuss's classic work, THE GIFT
RELATIONSHIP: FROM HUMAN BLOOD TO SOCIAL POLICY (1971) as offering "the essential
anti-commodification thesis that body products ought to be allocated by gift or donation
only, not through sale, because market exchanges of these products would commodifY
human beings in ways incompatible with human dignity."); Commodification and
Women~ Household Labor, in RETHINKING COMMODIFICATION, at 299-300 (critiquing
from a feminist perspective, the conventional separation between allowed gifts and
forbidden sales in the context of surrogacy).
216 See,
e.g., Lee Anne Fennell, Unpacking the Gift: flliquid Goods and
Empathetic Dialogue, in THE QUESTION OF THE GIFT: ESSAYS ACROSS DISCIPLINES 85,
93-94 (Mark Osteen ed., 2002) (arguing that gift-giving differs from market exchange
because, through gifts, each party engages in "imaginative participation in the life of
the other," helping to cement relationships).
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spheres that are considered to be remote from law because of
their relational, intimate and affective profile. Since contract
law is traditionally connected with the market, this worry is
also linked to the fear of blurring the lines between market and
non-market domains.217 This fear is described by Eisenberg as
the fear of impoverishing the non-legal world of gifts as a result
of contaminating it with legal and market-born ideas. 218
It is not clear what the grounds for Eisenberg's
contamination concerns are, since he does not offer any
example of similar processes where the touch of law has
destroyed non-legal dynamics. This is not a marginal point
because, as mentioned earlier, there are many other Western
legal systems that do enforce donative promises without any
reported damage to the world of gift. 219 In any case, even
assuming that such harm is possible, our analysis of the
affective dynamics can offer some comfort. There is no doubt
that an enforcement rule may lead to litigation, and litigation
can trigger negative emotions that conflict with the positive
cycle of empathy and gratitude. Yet it is important to note that
the interruption of affective harmony does not originate in the
chosen rule of law. Whenever a promise is not kept, negative
emotions are likely to arise, either for the promisee (if the
promise is not enforced) or for the promisor (if it is enforced).
Once self-interests override empathic altruism and take over,
gratitude and trust turn into disappointment and frustration,
while harmony is severely interrupted. In other words, much
of the damage is done regardless of the availability of legal
response. In contrast, life in the shadow of the law, where legal
217 A similar argument has been used for decades to justify unenforceability of
economic promises that were made in the intimate sphere where restrictions of
enforceability were explained as a way "to mark the dignity and specialness of intimate
relations." See, e.g., Jill Elaine Hasday, Intimacy and Economic Exchange, 119 HARv.
L. REV. 491, 493 (2005). For a critique of Hasday's analysis from a feminist
perspective, see Hila Keren, Can Separate Be Equal? Intimate Economic Exchange and
the Cost ofBeing Special, 119 HARv. L. REV. F. 19 (2005).

Since Eisenberg's definition of donative promises locates them as part of the
intimate sphere, the connection between the debates is more than accidental. In
both cases it is hard to accept that the denial of law from the allegedly non-legal
spheres (the domestic arena and the world of gifts, respectively) stems from a
belief in their superiority.
218

Eisenberg, supra note 6, at 847.

JOHN P. DAWSON, GIFrS AND PROMISES: CONTINENTAL AND AMERICAN LAw
COMPARED (1980).
219
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remedies are available, may turn out to be more respectful to
the original feelings and may deter people from changing their
mind after promising while surrendering to their more-selfish
inner voices.
Professor Eisenberg further argues that, under an
enforceability rule, the recipient won't be able to know whether
the promise was kept for the right reasons (the original care for
the other) or for the wrong reasons (the fear of legal sanction)
and that such ambiguity would destroy the spirit of the gift. 220
However, as we have seen, the affective response of the
promisee, the feeling of gratitude, emerges in response to the
original expression of empathy by the promisor. At this early
phase the law is remote and has no bearing on the situation
unless it is invoked by the parties. The positive intentions of
the promisor in the moments of promising then cannot be
obscured by the possibility of enforcement and cannot deprive
the promise of its generous character. Quite to the contrary: a
promise that is accompanied by a special intentional effort to
make it legally binding may communicate more care and
empathy and more commitment to the giving than a promise
that is made carelessly or in a fashion that avoids the law.
Moreover, market atmosphere is not innately threatening.
Sometimes it is the denial of legal or market tools that can be
weakening, while their availability may become empowering
and liberating. 221 Blurring the lines between markets and gifts
can help rather than harm the world of gifts by emphasizing
rather than obscuring the importance and the distinct affective
value of the gift. Consider, for example, the flourishing market
in gift cards.
Many people invest time and energy in
exchanging money for a colorful plastic card that has the same
or similar value. What can explain this behavior is a need to
distinguish the gift-ness of the thing that is going to be
transferred and differentiate it from a payment of money.
Although not always the most personal or creative gifts,222 gift
Eisenberg, supra note 6, at 847.
Compare to the feminist concerns with regard to the absence of law from the
domestic sphere.
See, e.g., Hasday, supra note 217, at 517 (arguing that
unenforceability of intimate agreements "appear[s) to have systematically adverse
distributional consequences for women and poorer people, maintaining and increasing
distributive inequality.").
222 Donative promises of the kind discussed here should not be compared to
creative gifts such as hand-made unique pieces of jewelry. For the most part the
220
221

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol40/iss2/3

64

Keren: Considering Affective Consideration

2010]

CONSIDERING AFFECTIVE CONSIDERATION

229

cards at least offer people a way of marking the nature of their
giving by relying on the market. The market then does not
ruin the spirit of the gift, as suggested by Eisenberg, but rather
is assisting people in calling attention to the fact that what
they are giving is a thing that carries something in addition to
its monetary value.
Even if there is no ground for actual contamination, can it
be that the risk still exists at a more symbolic level? Can it be
that merely thinking about law and emotions in tandem can
impoverish the world of gift by having a weakening impact over
the affects that structure this world? Not according to law-andthe-emotions scholarship. As argued in previous work, law can
engage the emotions in quite a few distinctive ways, either
purposely or inadvertently,223 and its interaction with emotions
is so complex that it cannot be assumed that applying law will
always harm the emotions. The law can, for example, express
emotions, channel them, and even foster and cultivate them. 224
It is, therefore, far too simplistic to assume that applying law
to an affect-laden context will necessarily have a negative
effect.
Furthermore, a negative impact of law may be a product of
particular legal norms, for example when legal rules isolate
prisoners and thereby harm their sense of hope. However, the
view that the law will have such a negative impact just because
of its supposed inherently rational nature seems to be unsound.
Similarly, the argument that the prospect of future
enforcement can color or obscure emotions that arise in the
present is equally doubtful. Consider, for example, the fact
that the law is available to enforce prenuptial agreements and
to preside over the process of divorce, yet that legal presence
does not impoverish people's love life during the marriage.
Law is also capable of intervention in cases of adoption and
promises discussed here are to transfer money or tangible assets that have relatively
clear monetary value. In general, money gifts are viewed by many as sending out a
weaker message of care than a purchased gift, and even more so if compared to handmade gifts. See David Cheal, "Showing Them You Love Them"; Gift Giving and the
Dialectic of Intimacy, in THE GIFT: .AN INTERDISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVE 95 (Aafke E.
Komter ed., 1996). In this sense, donative promises can be seen as occupying a hybrid
space with elements of gift and of market to begin with.
223 Kathryn Abrams & Hila Keren, wno~ Afraid of Law and the Emotions, 94
Minn. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2010).
224 Id.
(suggesting "A Framework for Analyzing Law~ Relations to the

Emotions").
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custody, yet this does not corrode the richness of emotions that
are associated with parenthood. Correspondingly, there is no
apparent reason to believe that applying law to donative
promises will cause, in and of itself, a weakening of the
empathy, care, love, and gratitude that are associated with the
giving and receiving of gifts. Additionally, even if some price
has to be paid in this regard and there is some affective cost
attached to legal intervention, it does not follow that promises
of gifts should not be enforced. Notably, there is no evidence
that family relations or friendships are stronger in the United
States than in countries that enforce promises of gifts.

E. A SUGGESTED REFORM: "CONSCIOUS ENFORCEMENT"
After considering the affective benefits and detriments
that playa role in the donative-promises arena, it is no longer
clear what may justify a sweeping unenforceability rule. The
doubt and the need for change are especially significant when
the promisor's intention to make a legally binding promise is
evident, such as when that intention is expressed in explicit
words or by an effort to artificially satisfy the conventional
consideration requirement. However, American contract law
"close[s] the door on enforcement entirely, whether the parties
intended legal liability or not.,,225 Section 21 of the Second
Restatement of Contracts generalizes the rule that applies to
all promises - bargained-for as well as donative - and clarifies:
"Neither real nor apparent intention that a promise be legally
binding is essential to the formation of a contract.,,226 For the
most part this section works to release commercial promisors
from the extra burden of documenting intent and therefore it
makes it easier for parties to exercise their freedom to
contract.227 And yet, when applied to donative promises the
section has the opposite effect: it means that parties who want
to create a legally binding donative promise cannot - under the
current regime - enjoy the freedom to do so and cannot create
an affectively based contract. One way to understand the
225

Gregory Klass, Intent To Contract, 95 VA. L. REV. 1437, 1494 (2009) (emphasis

added).
21 (1981).
One exception within the market world is the requirement that the
enforcement of preliminary agreements depends on the parties' intention to be legally
bound. See Klass, supra note 225, at 1494.
226

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §

227
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notion that the intent of the parties is irrelevant in a
contractual system that is supposed to be grounded on their
will is to recognize that, as far as the commercial sphere is
concerned, the existence of intent is inferred from the existence
of consideration. A promise given for consideration enjoys a
presumption that it is intended to be legally binding. This is a
strong and unmitigated presumption and thus no further
evidence is needed or, if offered, can change the result of
enforceability. A similarly total presumption seems to apply to
a donative promise, where the supposed lack of consideration is
taken as an absence of an intention to create a legally binding
promise. Here, too, no additional evidence is required in order
to show the lack of intention, nor does it matter if the promisee
can offer evidence that such intention did exist.
It is at this point that the affective analysis offered here
can have normative significance, as it undermines the
conclusion that the lack of conventional consideration
necessarily means that intention is absent. As we have seen
throughout the discussion, people have serious reasons to
promise gifts that carry legal consequences, for example in
order to allow the persons they want to benefit to fully rely on
their promises and/or to allay concerns that they will not be
alive long enough to perform the promises and that their heirs
will try to breach. Accordingly, a rule could have been adopted
that donative promises will be enforced in the same manner
that bargained-for promises are being enforced, i.e.,
irrespective of intention. However, respecting the emotions of
empathy and gratitude seems to require more sensitivity, not
in order to totally deny the enforceability of donative promises,
but in order to verify that their enforcement is truly what the
parties wished for and relied on.
To encompass the importance of the freedom to have a
contract in the affective domain, on the one hand, and the
distinctive character of donative promises and the "world of
gift," on the other hand, it is proposed to design a special rule
of enforcement. The suggested rule would require courts to be
more conscious and sensible about the decision to enforce
donative promises and it therefore it can be referred to as a
It would refrain from
rule of "conscious enforcement."
automatically denying the enforcement of donative promises
but, at the same time, would not apply the opposite rule of
unlimited enforcement. Instead, it would seek an intermediate
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norm that is set somewhere on the spectrum between the high
level of enforcement granted to market promises and the nonenforcement currently applied to donative promises.
To accomplish such a goal we can adopt any of several
variations of conscious enforcement, which differ by their
distance from the now-existing unenforceability rule.
Generally speaking, it is possible to tailor a rule of contingent
enforceability under which donative promises will be enforced
provided that they were intended to be legally binding. Such
special and limited enforceability can be phrased in several
ways to reflect different degrees of legal support. It is viable,
for example, to design a relatively conservative rule that
deviates only slightly from the current unenforceability regime,
by setting unenforceability as the default norm unless a clear
intention of the promisor to make a legally binding promise can
be shown. Such variation may be shaped in an extremely
restrictive way, such as by adding a requirement that the legal
intention be explicitly stated in writing, or in a more flexible
form where counter-intention can be shown in more than one
way. Another alternative is to further highlight the potential
legal meaning of a donative promise by adopting a rule that
renders it enforceable if it· contains an expression of the
promisor's intent to make it legally binding. 228 One major
difference between the alternatives is symbolic: while the first
variation marks donative promises as generally unenforceable,
the second underscores their potential to become enforceable.
Choosing between the two main models of conscious
228 Some formal requirements may be added here, such as the need for a written
or even signed statement of the promisor. One possible model can be found in
Pennsylvania, where a written gratuitous promise is enforceable if it "contains an
additional express statement, in any form of language, that the signer intends to be
legally bound." 33 PA. STAT. ANN. § 6 (1997). I thank Professor Gregory Klass for this
reference. The background of the Pennsylvania rule adds a practical dimension to the
theoretical uneasiness that accompanies the dichotomy of bargained-for/gratuitous
promises.
See James D. Gordon III, Consideration and the Commercial-Gift
Dichotomy, 44 VAND. L. REV. 283, 311-12 (1991) (describing the history of the act as
follows: "in 1925 the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws
proposed the Model Written Obligations Act. The Act provides that a signed written
promise shall not be unenforceable for lack of consideration if the writing contains 'an
additional express statement, in any form of language, that the signer intends to be
legally bound.' Only Pennsylvania and Utah adopted it, however, and Utah later
repealed it. Other states were reluctant to adopt the Act because such a clause could
be inserted into the body of an unread printed form, and therefore the express
statement of an intention to be bound did not ensure that the intention really existed.
At the same time, the form could leave the other party's performance optional.")
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enforceability and deciding about the particulars of their
internal design does not seem necessary at the moment,
although the analysis of the social value of empathy and
gratitude does suggest that the latter model, which is a proenforcement rule, might fit better with public-policy goals such
as fostering positive emotions. 229 Nonetheless, even a moremoderate reform could contribute immensely to the freedom to
contract, namely the freedom to make legally binding donative
promises, and can more appropriately indicate the individual
and social value of affectively motivated promises.
Finally, conscious enforcement of donative promises will
not only benefit the world of gift, it can also enrich the world of
contracts and the law. If donative promises are taken to be
honest expressions of empathy and altruism, rather than
selfish bargains in disguise, then the legal support of such
promises by means of contractual enforcement may develop
new capacity within contract law. By offering enforceability to
donative promises, the law may be seen as playing a new role:
helping the promisor to express and communicate her feelings
about the promisee and their relationship. It would also
support and foster the existence of empathy and gratitude in
society. In this respect it is imperative to remember the
symbolic power of law. For most people who live in the shadow
of the law, the ability to enforce a promise signifies the
investment of social resources in the promise and, by extension,
its social importance. 23o
229 The concrete design of a conscious enforceability rule can benefit immensely
from taking into account two separate questions that are defined by Professor Klass.
The first is whether to adopt an enforcement or nonenforcement interpretive default.
The second relates to the way to prove non-default intentions (opting out) where the
main alternatives are burdening the party who wants to opt out to express her
intention in a certain way or to rely on a court's determination of the promisor's
intention (based on the available evidence). For an illuminating discussion of those
questions, see Klass, supra note 225, at 1494.
230 Seeing law as actively facilitating these affective dimensions of human
interaction is a novel idea that has recently been framed and endorsed by law-and-theemotions scholars. It descriptively acknowledges that law participates in affective
processes, and it normatively supports this possible contribution. It also views the
integration of law and the emotions with caution - being attentive to the possibility of
concrete undesirable outcomes. To take another example connected to the intimate
sphere, one can think about the role of contract law in facilitating cohabitation
agreements between same-sex partners. On the one hand, the law of most states
prevents such partners from using marriage as a way of expressing feelings of longterm love, mutual commitment and trust. On the other hand, by utili2ing contract law,
with all its rituals and formalities, the law can help the same parties to convey their
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CONCLUSION

The law can relate to people's emotions in many sensible
and subtle ways - it does not have to be crude. Therefore, the
question of donative promises that lack a conventional sort of
consideration should not be limited to a Hamlet-style query: to
enforce or not to enforce. Instead, we should ask about the
appropriate legal response to the similarities and differences
between donative promises and bargained-for promises.
This Article demonstrated that those similarities and
differences do not support the existing reflexive denial of
enforcement, but rather justify some form of legal recognition.
It concluded with a concrete suggestion to move from total
refusal to enforce donative promises to a cautious willingness
to enforce them "consciously" in cases of existing intention to
create legally binding promises. Yet, the Article's sustained
examination of empathy and gratitude may prompt questions
that reach beyond the enforceability debate. For example,
understandings of gratitude may make us consider adding a
legal mechanism that ensures that the potential promisee is
willing to accept the emotional consequences (or costs) of a
donative promise. Similarly, it may lead us to allow the
promisor to revoke his promise in circumstances that reflect a
severe lack of gratitude. 231 In other words, the nuanced work of
how to enforce donative promises in a way that responds to
their special affective dimensions is a challenge that awaits the
attention of future law-and-the-emotions scholars.

emotions - toward each other and toward the larger world. Law, as seen from this new
perspective, becomes capable of closing the gaps between traditionally segregated
worlds. Importantly, it does that not by imposing itself or limiting people's freedom (as
law does when it bans marriage) but rather by offering them the benefit of its potential
effect on the emotions.
231 Such as in cases of a cruel treatment ofthe donor.
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